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Abstract
Research in the scientic eld of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) was star-
ted in the year 1982, when Andrew C. Yao presented the well known Millionaires'
problem [1]. Since then, this area of research has witnessed many new theoretical
results and technological advances, which made it possible to realize a large scale
of applications using techniques from SMC. However, one class of applications
has barely been touched in the past 25 years: The question of how to perform
secure computations with non-integer values, e.g. with values in a oating point
representation on large intervals taken from the domain of real values. This thesis
presents new results in this eld of research.
Our rst contribution is a new computational framework for SMC with real
values which are stored in a logarithmic encoding. This includes on the one hand a
representation scheme which allows to encrypt values stored in this representation.
On the other hand, our computational framework consists of secure protocols that
allow to perform all arithmetic operations on encrypted values encoded in this
representation scheme.
Next, we present a secure and ecient implementation of the IEEE 754 oa-
ting point standard. Our approach shows how to encrypt oating point values
in a way that all arithmetic operations, including the normalization operation,
can be performed interactively between two mutually distrusting parties with
acceptable computational and communication overhead.
We round o this dissertation with both a theoretical and a practical eva-
luation of the proposed techniques. Firstly, we give a thorough theoretical
complexity analysis which compares the two approaches in terms of computa-
tional and communication complexity. We further compare the two dierent
approaches with a basic scheme for a xed point representation, showing that
both approaches indeed outperform the xed point representation for computa-
tional problems of typical size.
Finally, we demonstrate the practical importance of the presented techniques.
2For this, we implemented two important algorithms from bioinformatics in the
developed framework, namely the forward and Viterby algorithm. These algo-
rithms typically tend to be numerically unstable, since they require computations
on decreasingly small probabilities. Our implementation shows that, using the
theoretical approach presented in this dissertation, it is in fact possible to e-
ciently solve these real world problems in the encrypted domain.
Zusammenfassung
Die Forschung zu Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) begann im Jahr 1982,
als Andrew C. Yao das Millionarsproblem vorstellte [1]. Seitdem hat die Wissen-
schaft in diesem Bereich groe Fortschritte gemacht, viele sicherheitskritische An-
wendungen wurden mittels SMC realisiert. Einzig die Anwendungen, die mathe-
matische Berechnungen auf nicht-ganzzahligen Werten durchfuhren, waren lange
Zeit von diesen Fortschritten ausgeschlossen. Zu diesen Anwendungen gehoren
beispielsweise Algorithmen, die Berechnungen auf groen Intervallen mit reellen
Zahlen durchfuhren.
Die vorliegende Dissertation prasentiert neue Ergebnisse in diesem Forschung-
sbereich. Zunachst wird eine neue Methode vorgestellt, die es erlaubt, sichere
Berechnungen auf reellen Zahlen durchzufuhren, die in einer logarithmischen
Reprasentierung gespeichert sind. Zum einen wird beschrieben, wie so reprasen-
tierte Zahlen eektiv verschlusselt werden konnen. Danach werden kryptogra-
phische Protokolle angegeben, die es erlauben bestimmte arithmetische Opera-
tionen mit auf diese Weise kodierten und verschlusselten Werten durchzufuhren.
In einem weiteren Kapitel wird eine sichere Umsetzung des IEEE 754 Gleit-
kommastandards prasentiert. Diese zeigt auf, wie Gleitkommazahlen verschlusselt
werden konnen. Zudem werden kryptographische Protokolle beschrieben, die
es erlauben Berechnungen auf solch verschlusselten Gleitkommazahlen durch-
zufuhren.
Abgeschlossen wird diese Dissertation mit sowohl einer theoretischen, als auch
einer praktischen Evaluierung der hier vorgestellten Techniken. Zunachst werden
in einer ausgiebigen theoretischen Komplexitatsanalyse die Rechen- wie auch die
Kommunikationskomplexitat der beiden neu vorgestellten Methoden zum Rech-
nen mit verschlusselten Zahlen vorgestellt. Danach wird die Performanz dieser
beiden Methoden mit einer Standardmethode verglichen, die auf einer Festpunk-
tarithmetik basiert. Es zeigt sich, dass beide Methoden fur typische Probleme
deutlich ezienter sind als die Festpunktarithmetik.
4Zum Abschluss wird auch die praktische Machbarkeit der neu vorgestellten
Techniken demonstriert. Dafur wurden zwei wichtige Algorithmen aus der Bio-
informatik implementiert, der Forward- und der Viterby Algorithmus. Diese
Algorithmen sind typischerweise numerisch instabil, denn sie fuhren ihre Berech-
nungen auf standig kleiner werdenden Wahrscheinlichkeiten durch. Die hier vor-
gestellte Implementierung zeigt, dass die neuen theoretischen Methoden auch in
der Praxis erfolgreich eingesetzt werden konnen, um real vorkommende Probleme
zu losen.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The dawn of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) dates back to the year 1982,
when Andrew C. Yao presented the well known Millionaires' problem [1]. One
can say that this started a new era in cryptography. Speaking in general terms,
the idea of SMC deals with the problem of how two or more parties can securely
evaluate a given function on their private inputs. While the result of the secure
computations should be revealed to at least one party, one major goal is that the
private inputs of each party remain hidden from all other parties.
Since 1982 and to this date, the scientic eld of SMC has witnessed a multi-
tude of new results and has undergone various innovative changes. This resulted
in a variety of dierent approaches to SMC. A remarkable early result in this eld
has been the completeness theorem given in [2], which states that any computable
function can be realized by SMC. Many subsequent publications have improved
the practical eciency of SMC. Consequently, new theoretical results in SMC,
as well as the technological advances in computer hardware, led to a number
of practical applications built on SMC which allow for secure computations on
private data.
In fact, due to the ever increasing amount of digitally stored data, there is a
growing need for technical solutions that protect sensitive personal information.
In the past, data privacy was mainly assured through procedures, laws or access
control policies. However, these protection mechanisms are ineective once data
is outsourced to partially untrusted servers or processed by third parties. To
alleviate this problem, special Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) have been
proposed that allow to keep sensitive data encrypted and compute directly on
encrypted values using cryptographic protocols. This strategy allows to control,
by design of the protocols, the amount of sensitive data that is leaked to the
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protocol participants. Commonly, these constructions use techniques from Secure
Multiparty Computation, which oer various dierent approaches to compute
securely with data represented as integers.
However, many computational problems require processing of very small non-
integer values, some of them in the range of 10 1 to 10 300 or even smaller. The
most prominent examples are applications that require processing of probabilities
over large sets of events, such as dynamic programming algorithms, where a large
number of probabilities have to be multiplied. Other problems require compu-
ting with values taken from a large interval such as [2 100; 2100], in a numerically
stable way. Numerical computations for eigenvalue or singular value problems,
dierential equations or matrix inversion constitute important examples of this
class of problems. Ecient solutions to these problems typically work with a
number representation which has a constant relative error when representing a
real value (in contrast to a constant absolute error, which is the case for a xed
point representation). Currently available solutions for SMC provide rather ef-
cient ways to perform computations on integer values. Implicitly, these tools
also allow to compute on rational numbers of a xed precision (by representing
the numerator and denominator separately) and on integers in xed point repre-
sentation (by appropriate scaling and quantization). However, these frameworks
usually cannot be used for the above-mentioned problems, as they are not well
suited to represent both large and very small values at the same time. Further-
more, rounding errors can accumulate once a large number of operations are
performed.
In this thesis, we provide for the rst time protocols allowing secure compu-
tations on non-integer values with a constant relative representation error. In
fact, this is an important problem in the eld of secure computations; as outlined
above, many computational problems demand the ability to compute privately
on both large and rather small values at the same time. In this thesis we will show
that computations on such approximations of real values are possible, and can
be used to build practical solutions to real world problems. We present the most
recent advances in this line of research; this includes a secure implementation
of the IEEE 754 oating point standard, as well as a computational framework
which represents non-integer values using a logarithmic encoding.
We demonstrate the applicability of our approach for computing with non-
integer values by considering an important problem in the context of bioinfor-
matics. In bioinformatics, it is commonly believed that advances in sequencing
technology will allow to sequence human genomes at low cost in the foreseeable
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future, eectively paving the route for personalized medicine [3, 4, 5]. Genomic
data will be used by healthcare providers to check for disease predispositions or
drug intolerances for individual patients. It can be foreseen that a service-based
industry will emerge, where special providers oer services to match genomic
sequences against models of specic diseases, as well as oering personalized
programs of drug application to such patients. In this context, two important se-
curity problems arise. First, genomic data must be considered extremely privacy
sensitive and should thus be strongly protected from abuse. Second, mathemati-
cal models for diseases and the related genomic details are valuable intellectual
property of the service provider, which is the basis of their business model. Thus,
privacy protection of genomic data and protection of the involved intellectual pro-
perty should be achieved at the same time. Ideally the computations should be
performed obliviously in a way that the parties do not need to disclose their data
to each other, but still gain the desired result. In this thesis it is shown how to
solve a problem in the aforementioned scenario, with good practical performance.
1.1 Outline
Our work on secure computations on non-integer values is based on various SMC
techniques, which in turn use a multitude of cryptographic primitives. We the-
refore review these cryptographic primitives in Chapter 2 and explain important
basic concepts of SMC in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we describe how the tech-
niques presented in Chapter 3 can be used to perform secure computations on
values stored in a xed point representation.
The remainder of this thesis is dedicated to the exploration of techniques
for SMC operating on non-integer values. Chapter 5 presents a framework that
allows secure two-party computations on approximations of values taken from
a bounded real domain. The proposed solution shows how to use a quantized
logarithmic representation of real values, which allows to represent both very
small and very large numbers with bounded relative error. Numbers represented
in this way can be encrypted using standard homomorphic encryption schemes.
Next, we describe protocols that allow to perform all arithmetic operations on
such encrypted values. Chapter 5 is based on the papers
[6] M. Franz, B. Deiseroth, K. Hamacher, S. Jha, S. Katzenbeisser, and H. Schroder.
Secure computations on real-valued signals. In IEEE Workshop on Information
Forensics and Security (WIFS'10). IEEE Press, Dez 2010.
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[7] M. Franz, B. Deiseroth, K. Hamacher, S. Jha, S. Katzenbeisser, and H. Schroder.
Towards secure bioinformatics services. In Financial Cryptography and Data Se-
curity (FC'11), 2011.
In Chapter 6, we investigated how to compute with encrypted oating point
values. Material in this chapter is based on the paper
[8] M. Franz and S. Katzenbeisser. Processing encrypted oating point signals. In
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Workshop on Multimedia and Security (MM&Sec
'11), New York, NY, USA, 2011. ACM.
The chapter presents a rst solution to the problem of computing with encrypted
oating point values that adhere to the IEEE 754 oating point standard. In
particular, we present secure and ecient protocols which allow to perform all
arithmetic operations on such encrypted values. Furthermore, we show how to
enhance these protocols to allow for a basic exception handling.
Chapter 7 compares the two approaches to represent and compute with en-
crypted non-integer values presented in Chapters 5 and 6 with each other. Fur-
thermore, we analyze the computational- and communication complexity of both
approaches and compare it to the basic xed point representation presented in
Chapter 4.
In Chapter 8 we describe applications of the techniques developed in Chapter
5 to the domain of privacy-preserving computations. In particular, we show how
to run two important algorithms in the context of data analysis using Hidden
Markov Models (HMM), namely the Viterbi and the forward algorithm, in a se-
cure manner. As a basic application, we consider the problem of private sequence
analysis from bioinformatics. In the current setting one party knows a protein
sequence, where the second party knows a HMM. While the parties learn whether
the model ts the sequence, they neither have to disclose the parametrization of
the model nor the sequence to each other. Practicality of the two applications is
illustrated by experiments on realistic protein sequences and HMM models. Our
experiments conrm the theoretic analysis put forward in Chapter 7; despite the
huge number of arithmetic operations required to solve the problem, we experi-
mentally show that HMMs with sizes of practical importance can obliviously be
evaluated using computational resources typically found in medical laboratories.
For example, our experiments show that evaluation of a medium sized HMM
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takes less than 5 minutes, even though about 450.000 arithmetic operations need
to be performed. These applications have been presented in [7] and in
[9] M. Franz, B. Deiseroth, K. Hamacher, S. Jha, S. Katzenbeisser, and H. Schroe-
der. Secure Computations on Non-Integer Values with Applications to Privacy-
Preserving Sequence Analysis.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries and
Cryptographic Primitives
2.1 Attacker Model
In the most general setting, we consider n parties jointly running a cryptographic
protocol. We will assume that a potential attacker has corrupted a subset of the
participating parties, has access to their data and controls the way they interact
with the other parties when running the protocol. We will distinguish between
two types of attackers (adversarial behavior) which will be described in this
section.
2.1.1 Semi-honest Attacker Model
A semi-honest (sometimes also called honest-but-curious) adversary tries to gain
as much information as possible from messages sent during the protocol, but he
follows the protocol faithfully and does not perform active attacks on it. For
example he might try to learn something from the messages he receives during
the protocol run, but he does not actively operate to corrupt, substitute or drop
messages. This attacker model is discussed in detail in [10, Chapter 7.2].
In order to prove that a two-party protocol is secure in the semi-honest atta-
cker model, it suces to show that the views of both parties can be eciently
simulated [10, Chapter 7.2]. For a protocol  this is the case if whatever can
be learned by a party running the protocol can be eciently computed from the
input and output available to that party. This is summarized by the following
denition:
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Denition. We say that a two-party protocol  privately computes a function
f if there exist probabilistic polynomial time algorithms (PPTAs) denoted by S1
and S2, such that
fS1(x; f1(x; y))gx;y c fView1 (x; y)gx;y;
fS2(x; f2(x; y))gx;y c fView2 (x; y)gx;y;
where x and y refer to the inputs of party 1 and 2, respectively. The view of
party i 2 f1; 2g is denoted by Viewi (x; y), and c denotes that the two views
are computationally indistinguishable.
This denition is explained in detail in [10]. Security for larger protocols
follows from the composition theorem for the semi-honest model [10, Theorem
7.3.3].
2.1.2 Malicious Attacker Model
The second attacker type is referred to asmalicious adversary. A malicious (some-
times also called active) attacker tries to inuence the execution of the protocol
to achieve his goals. Besides attempting to learn secrets of the other parties, he
may try to prevent the protocol from terminating with a correct result or send
corrupted information to inuence the results of the protocol. It is well known
how to transform any protocol secure in the semi-honest attacker model into one
that is secure against active adversaries [10, Chapter 7.4]. This is achieved by for-
cing the malicious attacker to behave in a semi-honest manner. Protocols secure
in the semi-honest attacker model are typically much more ecient than proto-
cols that are secure against active adversaries. More details about this attacker
type can be found in [10, Chapter 7.4].
2.2 Homomorphic Encryption
Many ecient cryptographic protocols make use of a special class of asymmetric
encryption schemes, namely homomorphic encryption. Speaking in mathematical
terms, this means that the decryption function
D : C !M
that maps a ciphertext c 2 C to a plaintext D(c) = m 2M is a homomorphism
of groups. Thus, D maps the neutral element of C to the neutral element of M ,
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and for two ciphertexts c1; c2 2 C we have that
D(c1) 1 D(c2) = D(c1 2 c2): (2.1)
In the typical examples of homomorphic cryptosystems the operation 1 will
be replaced by an addition while the 2 stands for the multiplication in the
underlying algebraic structure. These cryptosystems are referred to as additively
homomorphic cryptosystems. We will see concrete examples of cryptosystems
with an homomorphic property later in this section.
Note that this property also implies that the encryption
E :M ! C
that maps a plaintext m 2 M to a ciphertext c 2 C has some homomorphic
properties, namely that an encryption E(m11m2) can be computed from E(m1)
and E(m2) by computing E(m1) 2 E(m2), for the same operations 1 and 2 as
in Equation (2.1). This can be seen as follows. Let m1;m2 2 M two plaintexts
and c1 = E(m1), c2 = E(m2) 2 C two probabilistic encryptions of m1 and m2.
Then, by Equation (2.1), the value E(m1) 2 E(m2) will be decrypted to
D(E(m1) 2 E(m2)) = D(c1 2 c2) (2.1)= D(c1) 1 D(c2) = m1 1 m2;
and therefore E(m1) 2 E(m2) is an encryption of m1 1 m2. We will frequently
use homomorphic encryption, as it allows to perform linear operations directly
on ciphertexts.
We further require the cryptosystem to be semantically secure. In a seman-
tically secure cryptosystem, it is hard to decide which of two given ciphertexts
encrypts a certain plaintext. Vice versa, given a ciphertext and two plaintexts, it
is hard to decide which of the two plaintexts is encrypted by the ciphertext. For
this reason, semantic security implies probabilistic encryption [11]. This requires
the encryption function to be probabilistic.
One long time outstanding problem was the question whether so called fully
homomorphic cryptosystems exist. This question was answered armatively in
[12]. A fully homomorphic cryptosystem preserves the full ring structure of the
plaintext space, i.e. it is homomorphic under both addition and multiplication
at the same time. Unfortunately, even though the scheme in [12] has the afore-
mentioned properties, it is far from being used in practice. This is due to the
overwhelming costs which are required for the basic operations of the encryption
scheme, e.g. the size of a ciphertext or a key is hundreds of megabytes, making the
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scheme impractical to use in real world applications. Even though the scheme
presented in [12] was improved in [13], [14] and [15], it is still far from being
practical. We therefore only focus on additively homomorphic encryption in this
thesis.
2.2.1 Operations in the encrypted domain
In this section we will focus on additively homomorphic cryptosystems, that is,
cryptosystems for which Equation (2.1) holds and where the operations 1 and
2 can be replaced by an addition and a multiplication, respectively. This means
that with the addition as operation, the set of plaintexts M forms an abelian
group with neutral element 0 whereas the set of ciphertexts C forms a group
with the multiplication as commutative operation and the element 1 as neutral
element. Let c1; c2 2 C, then Equation (2.1) can be written as
D(c1) +D(c2) = D(c1  c2): (2.2)
This implies that, given two elements m1;m2 2M and their encryptions E(m1)
and E(m2), we can compute an encryption of m1 +m2 by calculating E(m1) 
E(m2).
From now on we will treat the plaintexts m1 and m2 as two elements of
some modular group (Zn;+), where n 2 N. We will show how the homomorphic
property enables us to perform certain arithmetic operations on them, even if only
their encryptions E(m1) and E(m2) are known. In the remainder of this thesis,
we will always assume that m1;m2  n, i.e. that when performing arithmetic
operations under the homomorphic encryption scheme overows modulo n do
not occur (except where explicitly stated).
2.2.1.1 Addition
The homomorphic property can be used to calculate the sum of two encrypted
values: Given two encryptions E(m1) and E(m2), we can directly compute the
encrypted sum E(m1+m2) of the two plaintexts by multiplying their encryptions.
This enables us to add two values m1, m2 available in encrypted form, without
decrypting and encrypting the result. Note that this can also be done without
knowing the private key.
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2.2.1.2 Multiplication with constants
A second operation that can be performed on an encrypted value E(m1) is multi-
plication by a constant k > 0. That is, we can compute the encryption E(k m1)
by raising E(m1) to the power of k. This is a direct result of applying Equation
(2.2) k   1 times, as
E(m1)
k = E(m1)  : : :  E(m1)| {z }
k times
= E(m1 + : : :+m1| {z }
k times
) = E(k m1):
As the plaintext space is Zn, we can also work with negative numbers. For
that we assume that the values m1;m2 2 Zn are small enough (in comparison to
the modulus n), so that reductions modulo n never occur. In this case we can
interpret the values n   1; n   2; : : : as the negative numbers  1; 2; : : : In this
representation we now can also multiply with integers k < 0. For such a k we
raise the encryption E(m1) to the power of n   k and accept that an overow
modulo n will occur:
E(m1)
(n k) = E((n  k) m1 mod n)
= E(n m1   k m1 mod n)
= E( k m1):
For completeness we mention that a multiplication with the constant value 0 can
be achieved by computing an encryption of 0.
2.2.1.3 Subtraction
Given the ability to multiply with negative numbers, we can also subtract an
encrypted value E(m2) from an encrypted value E(m1). This can easily be done
by using the operations for addition and multiplication with the number  1
(which corresponds to the number n   1 2 Zn) in the homomorphic encryption
scheme:
E(m1  m2) = E(m1 + ( 1) m2)
= E(m1)  E(( 1) m2)
= E(m1)  E(m2) 1:
2.2.2 The Paillier-Encryption Scheme
The Paillier cryptosystem [16] was presented by Pascal Paillier in 1999 and is
one of the few practical homomorphic public-key cryptosystems. Its security
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is based on a computational problem called the Composite Residuosity Class
Problem, namely the diculty of deciding whether a number m 2 Zn2 is an n-th-
residue modulo n2. Paillier identied cryptosystems based on this computational
problem as a new emerging class of cryptosystems, next to the ones that are based
on the integer factorization problem such as RSA [17] and those that are based
on the discrete logarithm problem such as ElGamal [18].
We will now describe the key generation process, the encryption and the
decryption operation before we demonstrate that the cryptosystem has the ho-
momorphic property.
2.2.2.1 Key Generation
In order to set up the cryptosystem, we rst need to pick two random prime
numbers p and q. We then set n = p  q, and calculate the value of Carmichael's
function (n), in our case
 := (n) = lcm(p  1; q   1):
We then randomly choose an element g 2 Zn2 so that the order of g is a nonzero
multiple of n. This can easily be validated by checking the equation
gcd(L(g mod n2); n) = 1;
where L is the following function. Let Sn = fu < n2 j u = 1 mod ng, then
8u 2 Sn we dene
L(u) =
u  1
n
:
As Paillier points out in [16], it usually suces to choose g = 2 as a small base.
We now consider the pair (n; g) as the public key, while the value  serves as
private key.
2.2.2.2 Encryption
As plaintext space we choose the numbers contained in Zn. In order to encrypt
a message m 2 Zn, we choose a random r 2 Zn and calculate the ciphertext
c = gm  rn mod n2:
Note that while we choose our message in Zn, we generate a ciphertext modulo
n2. Thus, the ciphertext space is Zn2 . We therefore accept a message expansion
of (at least) a factor of two.
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The cryptosystem oers probabilistic encryption, as for two dierent random
values r1; r2 2 Zn the message m 2 Zn will be encrypted to two dierent cipher-
texts. Paillier proved in [16] that this encryption scheme satises the denition
of semantic security.
Note that for a Paillier encryption c = gm  rn1 mod n2 of a plaintext m, we
can obtain a new probabilistic encryption c0 of m by choosing a random value r2
and computing
c0 = c  rn2 mod n2
= gm  rn1  rn2 mod n2
= gm  (r1r2)n mod n2:
The process of computing a new random encryption, given a ciphertext, will be
referred to as re-encryption.
Sometimes it is also useful to compute an encryption where the randomization
part is chosen to be equal to 1, i.e. we compute
c = gm  1 mod n2:
This will be referred to as deterministic encryption, and is computationally much
more lightweight than a full encryption. An example of a situation where deter-
ministic encryptions are useful can be found in Section 5.1.2.2.
2.2.2.3 Decryption
To decrypt a ciphertext c 2 Zn2 we again use the function L and calculate:
m =
L(c mod n2)
L(g mod n2)
mod n:
For a proof of correctness we refer to Paillier's original paper [16].
2.2.2.4 Homomorphic property
In order to prove that the Paillier cryptosystem has the homomorphic property,
we have to show that the Paillier decryption function Dsk : C ! M is a homo-
morphism (of groups). That is, it is a map from the multiplicative group (C; )
to the abelian group (M;+), where C = Zn2 is the set of possible ciphertexts
and M = Zn is the set of plaintexts.
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It can be seen that the function Dsk maps the neutral element 1C of Zn2 to
the neutral element 0M of Zn:
Dsk(1C) =
L(1 mod n2)
L(g mod n2)
mod n =
0
L(g mod n2)
mod n = 0M :
Furthermore, given two ciphertexts c1; c2 2 C, we know that there exist
m1;m2 2M and r1; r2 2 Zn such that c1 = gm1r1n mod n2 and c2 = gm2r2n mod
n2. Now we have
D(c1  c2) = D(gm1r1n mod n2  gm2r2n mod n2)
= D(gm1gm2r1
nr2
n mod n2)
= D(g(m1+m2)(r1r2)
n mod n2)
= m1 +m2
= D(c1) +D(c2);
which shows that Equation (2.1) holds for the Paillier decryption function, since
the product r1r2 has the same distribution as r1; r2.
2.2.2.5 Optimizations and a Generalization
In [19], a generalization of the Paillier cryptosystem is presented, which is known
as Damgard-Jurik cryptosystem. This generalization allows for a plaintext-space
of size ns, where n is the RSA modulus used in Paillier and s 2 N. Similar to
Paillier, the encryption function is given by
c = gm  rns mod ns+1:
Thus, the Damgard-Jurik cryptosystem contains the encryption scheme by Paillier
as the special case where s = 1.
Next, it is shown in [19] that the Paillier parameter g can always be set to
g = n+1. For a given plaintextm 2 Zn, this allows for a more ecient encryption.
In particular for Paillier (the case s = 1), the encryption can be performed as
c = gm  rn mod n2 = (n+ 1)m  rn mod n2 = (1 + n m)  rn mod n2;
thus one Paillier encryption requires only one exponentiation and two multipli-
cations.
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2.2.3 DGK Cryptosystem
In 2007, Damgard, Geisler and Krigaard [20, 21] presented a homomorphic
public-key cryptosystem which is semantically secure and has some interesting
advantages compared to the Paillier cryptosystem. We will now give a short
description of the DGK cryptosystem as it was proposed in [20, 21]. Compa-
red to Paillier, the scheme has substantially smaller ciphertexts and the smaller
plaintext- and ciphertext spaces result in a large performance gain.
2.2.3.1 Parameters
During the key generation process we choose public and private keys according
to some parameters that determine the security and essential properties of the
encryption scheme. Therefore, these parameters depend on the scenario in which
the DGK encryption scheme will be used. The parameters k, t and ` dened
here will be considered as public parameters that determine the structure of the
cryptosystem.
The parameters k and t are security parameters: k determines the size of a
RSA modulus and t, according to [20], should be large enough to make exhaustive
search and other generic attacks infeasible. The parameter ` is the bitlength of
values that need to be encrypted in the application scenario. If, for example, we
want to design a comparison protocol where two 16-bit numbers are compared it
suces to set ` = 16 [20]. As proposed in the original paper, realistic values for
the given parameters are k = 1024, t = 160 and ` = 16.
2.2.3.2 Key Generation
As in Paillier, we start with two primes p and q. These prime numbers should be
generated in such a way that their product n = pq forms a k-bit RSA modulus
and that three additional prime numbers u; vp; vq, with the following properties
exist: u is the smallest prime number greater than ` + 2 and u is a divisor of
both p  1 and q  1. The two values vp; vq should be t-bit prime numbers where
vp divides p  1 and vq divides q   1.
In a second step we choose random values g; h 2 Zn, so that the multiplicative
order of h is vpvq, while we require g to be an element of order uvpvq in Zn.
The plaintext space of the DGK cryptosystem is M = Zu. Note that, as the
prime number u is quite small, also the plaintext space Zu is small. Here lies
one big advantage of the DGK cryptosystem: When designing protocols, we will
many times raise an encrypted message to the power of a random element from
26 Preliminaries and Cryptographic Primitives
the plaintext space (used for multiplicative blinding { see Section 3.2.2). As in the
DGK cryptosystem the plaintext space is much smaller than for example in the
Paillier cryptosystem, these exponentiations are more ecient as the exponents
are quite small.
The ciphertext space is C = fgmhr mod n j m 2 Zu; r 2 Zvpvqg  Zn. We
now set the public key to (n; g; h; u) and the private key to (p; q; vp; vq).
2.2.3.3 Encryption
In order to encrypt a message m 2M , we raise g to the power of m and multiply
this with an uniformly random element of the subgroup generated by h. To
obtain such an element we can choose a random element r 2 Zvpvq and compute
hr, as the order of the subgroup generated by h is vpvq. An encryption of m can
thus be computed as
gmhr mod n:
Since both values vp; vq are part of the secret key, however, this can only be done
by the owner of the secret key. Knowing only the public key, but not the value
vpvq, one has to obtain the random element h
r in a dierent manner: We choose
the value r as a random 2:5t-bit integer. By choosing r in such a manner, we note
that it is much larger than the value vpvq. For such a large random value r the
value hr will then be indistinguishable from a uniformly random element from
the subgroup generated by h [20, 21]. In case we want to compute a deterministic
encryption, we simply compute
gm mod n;
i.e., we omit computation of the randomization part hr mod n.
Similar to the Paillier cryptosystem, also the DGK encryption scheme is se-
mantically secure (for a proof we refer to the original paper [20]). Therefore
the cryptosystem also oers probabilistic encryption. Note that for a DGK en-
cryption c = gmhr1 mod n of a message m, we can re-encrypt the probabilistic
encryption of m by choosing a random value r2 and computing
c  hr2 mod n = gmhr1hr2 mod n
= gmhr1+r2 mod n:
2.2.3.4 Decryption
Using the DGK cryptosystem, the owner of the secret key can eectively check
whether or not a provided ciphertext c is an encryption of 0. This is due to the
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fact that
cvpvq mod n = 1, c encrypts 0: (2.3)
To decrypt an arbitrary ciphertext c, one computes the value cvpvq mod n and
compares it to (gvpvq)m mod n for each m 2 M = Zu. As the value u and
therefore the number of possible values (gvpvq)m mod n is typically very small,
one can easily store them in a look-up table for more ecient decryption. For a
proof of correctness we refer to [20, 21].
2.2.3.5 Homomorphic property
The DGK cryptosystem is additively homomorphic. As for the Paillier cryptosys-
tem, we will show that the decryption function D : C !M is a homomorphism.
Equation (2.3) shows that D(1) = 0, so it remains to see that Equation (2.1)
holds. For two ciphertexts c1; c2 2 C, we know that there exist m1;m2 2M and
r1; r2 2 Zvpvq with c1 = gm1hr1 mod n and c2 = gm2hr2 mod n. Then it holds
D(c1  c2) = D((gm1hr1 mod n)  (gm2hr2 mod n))
= D(gm1gm2hr1hr2 mod n)
= D(g(m1+m2)h(r1+r2) mod n)
= m1 +m2
= D(c1) +D(c2):
In the next sections we describe other important cryptographic primitives
which will be used in the remainder of this thesis.
2.3 Oblivious Pseudo-Random Function Evaluation
An Oblivious Pseudo-Random Function (OPRF) is a two-party protocol, where
one party holds a secret key k and a second party wishes to evaluate a keyed
pseudo-random function FPRF(k; x) on a value x. The function evaluation is
oblivious in the sense that the party holding the key k does not learn x, while
the other party only obtains FPRF(k; x) and has no knowledge of k.
The rst construction of an OPRF was presented in [22] and has later been
modied in [23]. Important applications of OPRFs are secure protocols for key-
word search [22], set intersection [23] and adaptive oblivious transfer [24].
In this thesis we build secure protocols using the OPRF presented in [24]
(independently and concurrently also in [25]). Their protocol securely realizes
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the function
FPRF(k; x) = g
1
k+x ;
where g is the generator of a multiplicative group of order n, where n is an RSA
modulus. Our variation of their OPRF will be presented in Section 5.1.1. For
details on their construction, security assumptions and security proofs we refer
to [24].
2.4 Oblivious Transfer
Oblivious Transfer (OT) is an important cryptographic primitive which allows
two parties to obliviously transfer one value out of a set of n values. In particular,
party A has access to a list of values x1; : : : ; xn, while party B requests the value
present at the i-th position (with 1  i  n). OT allows to perform this operation
securely so that B only obtains the requested xi but not the other values, while
A does not see which value was requested (i.e., the index i).
In this thesis we will make use of an ecient protocol for OT that can be
found in [26]. Their solution consists of an initialization and an online phase.
The overhead of the initialization phase can be amortized over all consecutive
OT executions and is therefore negligible for most applications. The complexity
of the online phase mainly consists of three exponentiations. For details we refer
to [26].
2.5 Notation
We introduce some notation that will be used in the remainder of this thesis.
When we randomly and uniformly pick a value r from a (nite) set of numbers
S, we shortly write
r 2R S:
When we use square brackets (e.g. hi; [] or [[  ]]), we refer to a homomorphic
encryption of the value inside the brackets. By writing [m] for some m 2 Zn
we denote a Paillier encryption gm  rn mod n2 of m, where r 2R Zn. Similarly,
we use [[m]] for an encryption in the DGK cryptosystem. To denote that any
homomorphic encryption scheme can be used, we write hmi.
To denote that a value m is to be encrypted, we write
m) [m] or E(m):
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To denote decryption, we write
m( [m] or D([m]):
Note that, regardless of the cryptosystem in use, we will omit to explicitly
denote the public or private key which is used to perform the cryptographic
operations. From the context it will always be clear, which public or private key
should be used. A re-randomization of an encrypted value [m] will be denoted
by [m]re-rand.
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Chapter 3
Secure Computations on
Integer Values
In this chapter we describe the three major approaches to secure multiparty com-
putation, namely garbled circuits, homomorphic encryption and secret sharing.
Each of these approaches has its own strengths and weaknesses, and therefore
deserves special attention. The secure protocols described in the remainder of
this thesis are constructed mainly using homomorphic encryption and garbled
circuits. The main advantage of garbled circuits lies in its eciency when perfor-
ming non-linear operations, such as algorithms requiring the bit representation
of a given value. However, as we will see, garbled circuits have a large expansion
factor when encrypting inputs, e.g. one ciphertext typically consumes more than
80 times the space of its plaintext representation. This yields to secure protocols
with a high communication overhead. The approach of SMC via homomorphic
encryption is more ecient in this sense, but has drawbacks when it comes to
simple, but non-linear operations such as a comparison. For this reason in Chap-
ters 5 and 6 we will use a combination of these techniques to build our secure
protocols.
All secure protocols presented in this chapter and the remainder of this the-
sis are secure in the honest-but-curious model of secure computation (see Section
2.1), i.e., under the assumption that both participants faithfully follow the proto-
col specication. While the parties have to follow the protocols, they are allowed
to record all communication and draw conclusions from the observations they
make.
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3.1 Garbled Circuits
Garbled Circuits (GC) have been introduced in [27] and are a general solution
for SMC. Since the work of [27], garbled circuits have been frequently improved.
In this thesis, we use the construction proposed in [28] with optimizations in
[29, 30]. This allows XOR-gates to be evaluated at essentially no cost and each
garbled circuit table consists of three entries, instead of four. When evaluating
the complexity of our protocols, we will only count the gates other than XORs.
In this section we give a brief description of the basic GC techniques.
W1 W2 W3 =W1 ^W2
0 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
Table 3.1: Truth table for an AND gate with input wires W1;W2.
In the basic version of garbled circuits, two parties A and B want to privately
evaluate a function f(a; b) on their respective inputs a and b. The function f
needs to be specied as a Boolean circuit. In order to preserve the privacy of both
parties, the circuit needs to be garbled. For this, party B chooses two random
keys KW0 ;K
W
1 for each input wireW of the circuit. For each gate he writes down
the truth table, e.g. see Table 3.1 for an AND gate with input wires W1;W2 and
output wire W3.
W1 W2 K
W1 KW2 E(KW3)
0 0 KW10 K
W2
0 EKW10 jjK
W2
0
(KW30 )
0 1 KW10 K
W2
1 EKW10 jjK
W2
1
(KW30 )
1 0 KW11 K
W2
0 EKW11 jjK
W2
0
(KW30 )
1 1 KW11 K
W2
1 EKW11 jjK
W2
1
(KW31 )
Table 3.2: Encrypted truth table for an AND gate.
Next, for each output wire he encrypts the corresponding key with the two keys
assigned to the input values (Table 3.2). Finally, B randomly permutes the
encrypted values to obtain a garbled gate (Table 3.3). These garbled gates will
be sent to party A.
In order to decrypt the garbled table entries, A needs the keys of the input
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Permutation of E(KW3)
E
K
W1
0 jjK
W2
1
(KW30 )
E
K
W1
0 jjK
W2
0
(KW30 )
E
K
W1
1 jjK
W2
1
(KW31 )
E
K
W1
1 jjK
W2
0
(KW30 )
Table 3.3: Garbled AND gate.
wires. The keys for the inputs of B can be sent directly to A, along with the
circuit. A can obtain the keys for her inputs by using oblivious transfer (see
Section 2.4), in a way that she receives exactly one of the two keys KW0 ;K
W
1
for her input wires, and stays oblivious about the other. A can now iteratively
decrypt each garbled gate, obtaining the encryption keys of the next gate. The
GC protocol terminates depending on who should receive the nal output of the
computation: In case that party A is supposed to learn the output, B creates
the output gates dierently while generating the circuit. In this case, the output
gates directly reveal the nal output of this respective output gate, e.g. either 0
or 1. In case that B is supposed to receive the output, A sends the nal output
keys to B.
Rather than choosing the keys for all wires randomly, it suces for B to
choose only the keys KW0 for non-XOR gates at random. The corresponding
keys KW1 will then be dened as K
W
1 := K
W
0  S, for some xed random string
S. This way, an XOR gate of two given keys KW1i ;K
W2
j with i; j 2 f0; 1; g can
be computed as KW1i KW2j . Thus, no garbled truth table is needed.
Furthermore, for any non-XOR gate, we can specify the key KW30 to be an
encryption of KW10 ;K
W2
0 . This allows this value to be computed directly by A,
thus it does not need to be included in the garbled truth table.
For simplicity of notation, we will use Boolean operators to denote binary
gates, e.g. an AND gate with inputs a and b will be denoted by ab, OR gates
by a + b and XOR by a  b. The negation : will be realized as an XOR gate
with one constant input 1, a multiplexer will be denoted by MUXa(b; c), where
MUXa(b; c) = b if a = 1 and else outputs c. We use Ka to denote a garbled circuit
input corresponding to the boolean value a. Evaluation of Boolean operators as
a garbled circuit will be denoted by fgGC, e.g. we write fa + bgGC to denote
evaluation of a garbled OR gate on inputs a and b.
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3.2 Secret Sharing
A second approach to realize SMC is the use of secret sharing. In order to see how
a SMC protocol can be designed using secret sharing [31], we rst describe how
secret sharing works. Here we will only shortly review some specics of secret
sharing schemes, for a more detailed introduction into SMC and secret sharing
we refer to [32].
In an n-party secret sharing scheme, a secret value s can be broken up into
secret shares s1; : : : ; sn in a way that a subset of all these shares is necessary to
reconstruct the value s. To give concrete examples, in the following we will focus
on a two-party scenario, where the parties A and party B each share a value.
However, all results can easily be generalized to the n-party setting.
One simple example for a secret sharing scheme would be using addition in
a nite ring or additive group: Each of the two parties additively breaks her
input into shares (in a way that both shares are uniformly random elements) and
sends one share to the other party. For example a = a1 + a2 and b = b1 + b2.
It is obvious that each value can be reconstructed if and only if both shares are
known.
Let us now assume that each party has shared her private input with the
other party. That is, party A knows the share b1 of the input b and party B
knows the input a2 of the value a. Let f be a function that should be evaluated
in a secure way on the inputs a and b from our two parties, so the desired output
will be f(a; b). We call a secret sharing scheme homomorphic under the function
f , if each party can compute a share of the result of the function using her shares.
Finally the result f(a; b) can be reconstructed from these shares. In our example,
if the additive secret sharing scheme is homomorphic under the function f , party
A computes yA = f(a1; b1) whereas party B computes yB = f(a2; b2). Then the
value f(a; b) can be reconstructed from the shares yA and yB. It is easy to see
that the above additive secret sharing scheme is homomorphic under addition.
The probably most famous secret sharing scheme was proposed by Adi Shamir
in 1979 [31] and it can be used for general SMC [32]. Concerning the security
model, realizing SMC using a secret sharing scheme such as the Shamir scheme
typically leads to SMC techniques with perfect security (see [10], Section 7.6.1).
This is due to the fact that it is impossible for an attacker to learn anything
from the shares he receives, no matter how computational powerful he is. If
a SMC protocol based on secret sharing should be made secure against active
attackers, however, more advanced techniques such as veriable secret sharing
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are necessary [33].
In this thesis, two weak instances of secret sharing will be used, and will be
referred to as blinding. These basic techniques will be used to obfuscate certain
values while still being able to work with them (under the implied homomor-
phism). There are two basic approaches for blinding: Additive and multiplicative
blinding. We will present a short overview of these blinding techniques in this
section. We assume that all computations are done in a modular group Zn. Let
X be a random variable over Zn, and P (X = x) denotes the probability that X
takes on the value x. For a xed value x 2 Zn we will now see how additive and
multiplicative blinding can be used to obfuscate the value x.
3.2.1 Additive Blinding
There are two ways to additively blind the value x. The rst method produces a
uniformly random element y 2 Zn such that y does not reveal any information
about the value x nor the distribution of X. First we choose a random element
r 2 Zn, where the distribution of r is the discrete uniform distribution. This
means, we sample from a random variable R which takes on values r 2 Zn
with the same probability P (R = r) = 1n for all r 2 Zn. We then compute
y = r+ x mod n. It can easily be seen that the element y is a uniformly random
element of the set Zn, and therefore reveals no information about the value x.
Sometimes it is desired to not produce an overow modulo n when adding
the random element r. This is possible, if the statistical distance  between
the distributions of X and R is large enough. In this case, the probability of
revealing information about the value x and the distribution of X is negligible
in the security parameter . For further details we refer to Appendix A of [34].
3.2.2 Multiplicative Blinding
We will now assume that the random variable X takes on values from a eld
Zp, where p is a prime number. When using multiplicative blinding, we usually
want to obfuscate the value of x in case that x 6= 0. For this reason, when
using multiplicative blinding, the value x 2 Zp is multiplied by a random value
r 2 Zpnf0g. Then the result y = x  r mod p is equal to 0 if and only if x = 0.
In case x 6= 0, the value y should not reveal any information about the original
value x, that is, y should be a uniformly random element of Zpnf0g. This indeed
is the case, as the following theorem shows:
Theorem. Let R be a random variable with uniform distribution on Zpnf0g.
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For any x 2 Zpnf0g the random variable Y = x  R mod p is again uniform on
Zpnf0g.
Proof. As the random variable R takes values on 
R = f1; : : : ; p 1g, the random
variable Y = x  R only takes values on 
Y = fx  1; : : : ; x  p   1g. As in the
eld Zp there are no zero divisors and x 6= 0, the map f : Zp ! Zp, a 7! x  a
is a bijective homomorphism. Therefore 
R and 
Y are of the same cardinality
p   1 and we see that 
R = 
Y . Now P (Y = x  r) = P (R = r) for all r 2 
R,
in other words Y is uniform on 
Y .
Note that, when working with values from a plaintext space of a public key
cryptosystem (such as Zn or Zn2 with n being a composite), the theorem given
here is in general not correct. This is due to the fact that the plaintext space
of such a cryptosystem is a ring rather than a eld. In this case there are pairs
x; r for which P (Y = x  r) 6= P (R = r). However, the probability of randomly
selecting such a pair is negligible.
3.3 Homomorphic Encryption
A third way to build SMC protocols is to make use of a homomorphic public-key
cryptosystem. In the two party setting, it suces to use a standard homomor-
phic cryptosystem where one of the parties knows the public key. In case that
more than two parties participate in the computations, a threshold cryptosystem
should be used (see Section 2.2). In the latter case, encryptions can be compu-
ted by every party but ciphertexts can only be decrypted when certain parties
cooperate. Since in this thesis we will work in the two party setting, we will only
give a short description of the case for n  3 parties, and then focus on the two
party setting.
Initially, in order to compute the result of an arithmetic function, the invol-
ved parties set up a homomorphic cryptosystem. Every party can encrypt her
input using the public key. She then can provide this encrypted value to all the
participating parties, as under the threshold scheme they cannot decrypt cipher-
texts without the cooperation of the remaining parties. Using the homomorphic
property, as seen in Section 2.2.1, every party can then add or subtract two
encrypted values, or multiply them with arbitrary constants that are known as
clear texts.
In Section 2.2.1 we have already seen how we can perform arithmetic opera-
tions such as additions and multiplications with known constants in homomorphic
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encryption schemes on the encrypted values even without actually knowing the
values themselves or how to decrypt them. If we could use a fully homomorphic
cryptosystem (see Section 2.2) one could already compute any given function
under the homomorphism since the fully homomorphic scheme allows for both
additions and multiplications. However, since ecient fully homomorphic crypto-
systems are not available (and it is not clear whether they will be in the future),
we will see how to realize a secure multiplication using an additive homomor-
phic cryptosystem. This allows to construct a general approach for SMC using
homomorphic ciphers.
3.3.1 Secure Multiplication
While additions and multiplications with constants are immediately possible
when using homomorphic encryption, multiplications of ciphertexts require exe-
cution of a cryptographic protocol such as the one that was presented by Cramer,
Damgard and Nielsen [35]. Here we only give a short sketch of the protocol; for
a more detailed version and a proof of security we refer to the original paper [35].
In an n-party setting, we start with two encrypted values hai and hbi, and we
want to compute the encrypted product hci = ha  bi. This can be done in 5 steps
according to Protocol 1.
Protocol 1 Secure multiplication for n > 2 parties
Input: hai; hbi
Output: habi
1: Each party Pi chooses a random value ri and broadcasts an encryption of it.
2: All parties now can compute hri = hr1 + : : :+ rni and, using the homomor-
phic property, an encryption of a+r. Then ha+ ri is decrypted jointly using
threshold decryption, so that every party learns the value a+ r.
3: Now the rst party sets a1 = (a + r)   r1 and the remaining parties set
ai =  ri. Observe that a = a1 + : : :+ an.
4: Each party now computes hai  bi = hbiai and broadcasts it.
5: Now each party computes
ha1  bi  : : :  han  bi = h(a1 + : : :+ an)  bi = ha  bi:
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Secure Multiplication in the two-party case. In this thesis, we work in
the following setting: Party A holds a private key for some homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme. Party B holds two encrypted values hai; hbi and should obtain an
encryption habi. This can be achieved as depicted in Protocol 2. First, party
B generates two random values ra; rb and computes encryptions ha+ rai and
hb+ rbi. B sends these values to A, who subsequently decrypts, multiplies them
and sends an encryption of (a+ra)(b+rb) back to party B. Party B now recovers
the product by computing
habi = h(a+ ra)(b+ rb)ihbi rahai rbh rarbi:
If values a and b are known to be from the set f0; 1g, the operations become
much more lightweight. In this case the blinding factors ra; rb can also be chosen
as binary values. Party A now sends ha rai and hb rbi to party B, who
subsequently sends back the product h(a ra)(b rb)i. Here, we use  to denote
a bitwise XOR which can be computed on homomorphic encryptions hxi and hyi
as
hx yi = hxihyihxi 2y for x; y 2 f0; 1g:
As before, using the values ra; rb party B recovers the result habi. We denote a
secure multiplication by , a secure multiplication of binary values by ~. Note
that both protocols are only secure in the honest but curious attacker model. In
particular, the protocol for binary multiplication is only secure if the values a; b
are binary.
3.3.2 Integer Comparison
An important primitive in SMC is the comparison of two integer values. A basic
version of this problem is known as the millionaires' problem [1]. In order to
use it in larger SMC protocols we require a variant of this problem which allows
to also compare two encrypted values (e.g. see Section 5.2.4.3 for an example).
For this reason we describe a protocol which allows to compare two encrypted
`-bit values hai, hbi and consequently allows to select the minimum along with
some encrypted value, associated to the minimum. In particular given two tuples
(hai; hVai) and (hbi; hVbi), the protocol computes (hci; hVci) where c = min (a; b)
and Vc = Vmin(a;b). This problem diers from the standard millionaires' problem,
since both input values and the output need to remain hidden from both parties.
A solution to this problem has been presented in [36, 37] and is summarized here:
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Protocol 2 Secure multiplication in the two-party setting.
Input: hai; hbi
Output: habi
1: Party B:
Choose random values ra; rb.
Compute ha0i = ha+ rai and hb0i = hb+ rbi.
Send ha0i; hb0i to party A.
2: Party A:
a0 ( ha0i; b0 ( hb0i // Decrpyt
a0b0 ) ha0b0i // Encrpyt
Send ha0b0i to party B
3: Party B:
Compute habi = ha0b0ihbi rahai rbh rarbi
Initially party B, who has access to both hai and hbi, computes
hzi = h2` + a  bi = h2`i  hai  hbi 1,
where ` denotes the maximal bit length of a and b. As 0  a; b < 2`, z is a
positive (`+ 1)-bit value. Moreover, it holds for z`, the most signicant bit of z,
that
z` = 0, a < b.
Given an encryption of z mod 2`, the result can be computed immediately:
z` = 2
 `  (z   (z mod 2`)).
Once B has an encryption of the outcome hz`i = ha < bi, an encryption of
the minimum m, is easily obtained using arithmetic, as m = (a < b)  (a  b) + b.
Determining an encryption of the value Vc is analogous, (a < b)  (Va   Vb) + Vb.
It remains to describe how B obtains the encryption of z mod 2`.
First, party B generates a uniformly random (+ `+ 1)-bit value r, where 
is a security parameter, say 100, and  + ` + 1  log2(n). This will be used to
additively blind z,
hdi = hz + ri = hzi  hri;
hdi is then re-randomized and sent to A who decrypts it and reduces d modulo
2`. The obtained value is then encrypted, and returned to B.
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Due to the restriction on the bit-length of r, party B can now almost compute
the desired encryption hz mod 2`i. The masking can be viewed as occurring over
the integers, thus we have d  z + r mod 2` and
z mod 2`

=

d mod 2`

 

r mod 2`

mod 2`:
A has just provided hd mod 2`i and r is known to B. Thus, he can compute
h~zi = h(d mod 2`)  (r mod 2`)i = hd mod 2`i  h(r mod 2`)i 1:
Had the secure subtraction occurred modulo 2`, ~z would be the right result;
however, it occurs modulo n. Note, though, that if d mod 2`  r mod 2`, ~z is the
right result. On the other hand, if r mod 2` is larger, an underow has occurred;
adding 2` in this case gives the right result. So, if B had an encryption hi of a
binary value indicating whether r mod 2` > d mod 2`, he could simply compute
hz mod 2`i = h~z + 2`i = h~zi  hi2` ;
which adds 2` exactly when r mod 2` is the larger value. This leaves us with a
variant of Yao's millionaires problem: B must obtain an encryption hi of a binary
value containing the result of the comparison of two private inputs: d^ = d mod 2`
held by A and r^ = r mod 2` held by B.
The solution to this nal problem is based on Damgard et al. [20, 21]. In
their work, for eciency reasons they use the DGK cryptosystem which was
simultaneously proposed in [20, 21] (see Section 2.2.3 for details). Though the
basic setting of Damgard et al. considers one public and one secret value, they
note how to construct a solution for private inputs. They also note how to obtain
a secret output. However, they obtain this output as an additive secret sharing,
while in our setting B must receive a homomorphic encryption (either DGK or
Paillier) hi at the end of the protocol. Naturally A must not see this encryption
as she knows the secret key.
We assume that A has run the DGK key-generation algorithm and has sent
the public key to B. This key pair can be re-used whenever the comparison
protocol will be run. Initially, A sends B encryptions of the bits of her input,
[[d^` 1]]; : : : ; [[d^0]]. B then chooses s 2R f1; 1g and computes
[[ci]] = [[d^i   r^i + s+ 3
` 1X
j=i+1
wj ]] = [[d^i]]  [[  r^i]]  [[s]] 
0@ ` 1Y
j=i+1
[[wj ]]
1A3 ; (3.1)
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where [[wj ]] = [[d^j  r^j ]], which he can compute as B knows r^j . For technical
reasons (to avoid the case d^ = r^), we append diering bits to both d^ and r^, i.e.,
we compare the values 2d^+ 1 and 2r^ instead.
Equation (3.1) diers from the one proposed by Damgard et al. in order to
eciently hide the output, but the core idea remains. Consider the case of s = 1;
if d^ is larger, then all ci will be non-zero. However, if r^ is larger, then exactly
one ci will equal zero, the one at the most signicant diering bit-position. Both
claims are easily veried. For s =  1 we have exactly the same situation, except
that the zero occurs if d^ is larger. The factor of 3 ensures that the values are
non-zero once even a single wj is set.
B now multiplicatively masks the [[ci]] with a uniformly random ri 2 Zu
[[ei]] = [[ci  ri]] = [[ci]]ri ;
re-randomizes and permutes the encryptions [[ei]] and sends them to A. Note that
ei is uniformly random in Zu except when ci = 0, in which case ei also equals
zero, i.e. the existence of a zero is preserved.
A now decrypts all ei and checks whether one of them is zero. She then
encrypts a bit ~, stating if this is the case. At this point she switches back to
the homomorphic cryptosystem denoted by hi, i.e. A sends h~i to B. Given
the knowledge of s, B can compute the desired encryption hi: while h~i only
states whether there was a zero among the values decrypted by A, s explains
how to interpret the result, i.e. whether the occurrence of a zero means that
r^ > d^ or d^  r^. In the former case, B negates the result h~i under encryption
by computing hi = h1  ~i. Otherwise he directly takes h~i as output hi. For
more details and a graphical presentation we refer to [36].
3.4 Related Work
We use this section to summarize and cite related work which is not covered in
detail by Chapters 2 and 3, but should be mentioned for completeness reasons.
3.4.1 SMC on Binary and Integer Arithmetic
Several constructions for Secure Multiparty Computation are known in the lite-
rature. Yao's famous Millionaires problem [1] and the rst general approach to
SMC [2] are mentioned in the introduction of this thesis.
Various other approaches for securely evaluating a function have been develo-
ped for dierent function representations, namely combinatorial circuits [27, 38],
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Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams [39], branching programs[40], homomorphic
threshold encryption [35] or one-dimensional look-up tables [41]. While the lat-
ter solve the problem of secure function evaluation in the semi-honest attacker
scenario, the works of [42, 43] present a solution for the malicious case.
A number of frameworks have been proposed which are supposed to hide
cryptographic details from the user and allow for a direct implementation of
privacy-preserving applications: Fairplay [44], VIFF [45] and TASTY [46] consti-
tute important examples. Parts of our protocols are ready to be implemented in
either of these frameworks.
3.4.2 SMC on Non-Integer Values
While the methods presented above target computations performed over the in-
tegers only, extensions were proposed that can handle rational numbers [47] and
real values in xed point notation [48, 49]. The proposed framework [48] presents
secure protocols for all arithmetic operations in a multiparty setting with 3 or
more parties. All computations are performed on scaled and quantized values
with xed precision. While all arithmetic operations are rather ecient, the
proposed framework comes with a major drawback: In order to prevent scaling
factors to accumulate, after each arithmetic operation a truncation step needs to
be performed, which may introduce an error in the least signicant bit of the re-
sult. This is an eect of a probabilistic rounding operation. The work presented
in [49] proposes an ecient technique which overcomes this rounding problem in
the two-party setting. Their work can easily be extended to a framework for xed
point computations (see Chapter 4), with better performance than [48]. Even
though very ecient, however, all these approaches do not provide numerical
stability when performing a large number of arithmetic operations on very small
values; indeed there are applications where it is known that a xed point repre-
sentation does not yield to accurate results. For example, we will see in Chapter
7 and 8 that a log encoding based representation is advantageous for the consi-
dered application scenario, when compared to a xed point implementation with
suciently large precision, both in terms of accuracy and eciency.
3.4.3 Selected SMC Applications
There has been an increasing interest in the use of Secure Multiparty Compu-
tation to enhance privacy in auctions [50], data clustering [51, 52], analysis of
medical signals [53], to name only a few application scenarios.
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In particular, the eld of signal processing in the encrypted domain has be-
come an important eld of research, and can benet from the techniques presen-
ted in this dissertation. Processing of encrypted signals aides to enhance privacy
in many sensitive applications, such as classication of signals in medical appli-
cations [54] or evaluation of biometrics on encrypted data [37]. Typically, these
applications come from domains that require processing of real-valued signals.
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Chapter 4
Secure Computations in Fixed
Point Representation
Several strategies to securely compute with non-integer values have been discus-
sed in the literature. The usual way to deal with this problem is to quantize, i.e.
to compute with scaled and rounded approximations of real values. In fact, this
strategy corresponds to the implementation of a xed point representation. Even
though the techniques presented in this chapter can be considered as folklore they
will be detailed here to serve as a basic reference implementation in Chapter 7.
The ability to perform secure computations using a xed point representa-
tion already allows for a large class of applications to be implemented. However,
there are still many algorithms which can not be realized by these techniques.
Examples are algorithms for (non-) linear or dynamic programming which typi-
cally work on very small probabilities, or numerical computations such as solving
linear equations, singular value decomposition etc. As we will see in Chapter 7,
these problems would typically require xed point arithmetic with a precision
that lies out of a practical scope.
4.1 General Idea
Given the methods described in Chapter 3 to compute on integer values, it is
straightforward to describe a computational framework which allows to compute
on non-integer values in a xed point representation. Assume we want to per-
form computations on values with a fractional part of at most ` bits. Then it
suces to multiply each value with a scale factor of 2` and round to the nearest
integer. Now, all operations can be performed using integer arithmetic. After
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each multiplication, the scale factor accumulates. Care must be taken if two
values should be added which have dierent scale factors; in this case the value
with the smaller scale factor needs to be adjusted. Given that most schemes for
SMC only allow for a limited plaintext space, the above described scheme only
allows for a very small number of consecutive multiplications.
4.2 Rounding Strategies
In order to overcome this restriction, protocols have been presented which allow
to rescale the result of an multiplication [48, 49]. There are two kinds of pro-
tocols which achieve this functionality, so called probabilistic and deterministic
rounding protocols.
4.2.1 Probabilistic Rounding Protocol
The highly ecient probabilistic protocols in [48] and in [49] randomly introduce
an 1-bit error in the least signicant bit. With time, these random errors can
accumulate and propagate to the higher order bits and therefore invalidate the
results of the computations. For this reason, this drawback makes the protocol
only applicable for small applications that do not require too many consecutive
multiplications.
Protocol 3 Probabilistic Rescaling Protocol
Input: (B) ha2`i with 2`-bit quantization
Output: (B) ha`i with `-bit quantization
1: Party B:
Additively blind the value ha2`i with some value  r, chosen uniformly at
random.
Send ha2`   ri to party A.
2: Party A:
a0 ( ha2`   ri // Decrypt
2 `(a0   (a0 mod 2`))) ha00i // Cut ` least signicant bits and encrypt
Send ha00i to B
3: Party B:
Let r0 = 2 `(r   (r mod 2`))
r0 ) hr0i
Obtain ha`i as ha`i = ha00 + r0i
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A sketch of such a probabilistic rounding protocol can be found in Protocol 3.
The protocol is given the two party setting based on SMC using homomorphic
encryption. Party B holds a value ha2`i with a fractional part of bit length 2`,
and should obtain an encryption of the same value where the fractional part is
cut and rounded to a precision of ` bits.
First, party B sends an additively blinded version of the value a2` to party
A, who subsequently decrypts. Next, party A cuts o the least signicant ` bits,
and sends the result back to B. B adds the most signicant bits of r to the value
a00 in order to obtain a`. This third step has a chance of introducing a 1-bit
rounding error, i.e. the protocol has a chance of returing a`+1 instead of a`; the
error occurs if (a2`   r) mod 2` 6= (a2` mod 2`)  (r mod 2`).
Protocol 4 Deterministic Rescaling Protocol
Input: B: ha2`i with 2`-bit quantization
Output: B: ha`i with `-bit quantization
1: Party B:
Choose random values r1; r2.
ha0i = ha2`   r1i // Additively blind the value hai with value  r1
Create a Garbled Circuit C which computes
Garbled Circuit C
Input: a0
a00 = a0 + r1
~a = r2 + 2
 `(a00   (a00 mod 2`))
Output: ~a
Send ha0i and C to party A.
2: Party A:
a0 ( ha0i // Decrypt
Obtain a bit decomposition of a0
Evaluate C on a0, obtain result ~a = fCgGC.
~a) h~ai // Encrypt
Send h~ai to B.
3: Party B:
Obtain ha`i as ha`i = h~a  r2i
48 Secure Computations in Fixed Point Representation
4.2.2 Deterministic Rounding Protocol
The second class of protocols does not introduce probabilistic rounding errors,
and thus can be used for applications involving arbitrarily many consecutive
multiplications. However, this comes with a drawback in terms of complexity.
Protocol 4 depicts a sketch of the deterministic rescaling protocol presented
in [49]. What makes the protocol expensive for use in SMC applications, is the
large garbled circuit which has to be sent over the network. For large parameters
`, the circuit can easily take the size of a few hundred kilobytes up to some
megabytes, making this approach very unattractive for secure computations. In
addition to this, the size of the homomorphic encryptions grows very fast (see
Chapter 7 for details), making the public key operations computationally too
complex.
As it will be seen in Chapter 7, this approach for computing with non-integer
values is very ecient for small values `, e.g. when representing values that come
with small fractional part. For larger values `, a completely dierent computa-
tional approach is required.
Chapter 5
Secure Computations using
Logarithmic Encoding
As we have seen in Chapters 3 and 4 it is possible to eciently perform secure
computations on integer values, which implies the possibility to perform secure
and ecient computations on values stored in a xed point representation with
a small fractional part. In the past decade a number of applications using SMC
have shown that secure computations based on these techniques can indeed be
used in real world applications, with good performance. Recent examples can
be found in the area of private auctions [55], biometric computations [36] and
privacy-preserving data mining [56].
Most of the above mentioned applications only consider scenarios where com-
putations are performed using integer or Boolean arithmetics. Applications which
require to perform computations on non-integer data, such as oating point va-
lues, have rarely been presented. In fact, a thorough investigation of techniques
that would allow for secure computations on non-integer values was missing.
In this chapter we close this gap and present a computational framework
which allows two semi-honest parties to perform secure computations on non-
integer values which come from a bounded real interval D = [ ; ]. Our
solution provides numerical stability : Computations can be performed on arbi-
trarily small or large numbers with nite precision, but yield to results as if they
were computed with standard oating-point arithmetic. While in this chapter we
refrain from implementing a standardized oating point encoding, we do use a
representation that shares the most important properties of oating point arith-
metic, i.e. values in D close to zero are represented with higher accuracy than
larger values, yielding to a bounded relative error, regardless whether represen-
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ting very small or very large values.
5.1 Private Function Evaluation
In this section we describe a two-party protocol which allows to evaluate a com-
plex function f : X ! Y with X ;Y  N and X = [xlow ;xup ] in a private way.
This primitive, which will be used as a central building block in our framework,
allows to evaluate f on an encryption hxi of a value x 2 X , producing an encryp-
tion hf(x)i, while keeping x and f(x) secret from both parties. In particular,
this will be achieved by performing an oblivious table lookup. The table will be
denoted by T = (xi; f(xi))xi2X ; we use T (x) to denote the entry of the table T
at position x. The construction will be given in the aforementioned two party
scenario, where one party A holds the private key for some homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme, and another party B holds an encryption hxi of a value x and learns
an encryption hT (x)i of T (x). Neither party is allowed to learn the value x nor
the plain table entry T (x).
We will investigate two dierent approaches to implement this operation:
The rst approach is based on Oblivious Pseudo-Random Function Evaluation
(OPRF), while the second approach is based on Oblivious Transfer (OT). As we
will see, the rst approach achieves a lower communication complexity than the
second approach for small table sizes. While the second approach requires slightly
more communication, the clear advantage is its low computational complexity.
Both approaches allow for adaptive protocols, that re-use the table T for va-
rious look-up operations. This results in less communication and computational
complexity, as complexity can be amortized over a certain amount of operations,
yielding to a much better practical performance. In particular this means that
the table has to be generated and transferred only once, and then can be used
for a variable number of times. Adaptive protocols still hide the values x and
f(x), at the price that party B can learn whether a value was queried more than
once. However, party B will have no information which value was queried more
than once; furthermore, B will not learn any information on values queried only
once. Depending on the application scenario, this may be acceptable if this event
happens rarely.
5.1.1 OPRF Construction
This construction is based on OPRFs introduced in [22]. In this section we assume
that all values are encrypted in the Paillier encryption scheme, thus messages
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come from the plaintext space Zn for some RSA modulus n (see Section 3.4).
The protocol consists of two phases: one initialization and one evaluation phase.
In the initialization phase, A generates a prime number p in a way that n j (p 1)
and an element g of order n in Zp. A further selects a random element k 2 Zn.
These choices assure that gx = g
1
k+x (mod p) is a pseudo-random function [24].
Let again X = [xlow ;xup ] be the set of numbers on which f operates on. A
prepares a table T with two columns, where the rst column contains the value
gx = g
1
k+x and the second column contains an encryption of f(x) for each x 2 X .
Furthermore A permutes the table by sorting in ascending order according to
the rst row. Now A sends the table T together with an encryption of k used in
the function g
1
k+x to party B. The protocol for the initialization is depicted in
Protocol 5.
Protocol 5 Computing f(x) using OPRFs { Initialization Step
Input: Party B: [x]; [k]; T
Output: Party B: [f(x)]
1: Party A:
Choose k 2R Zn
for each x 2 X
Add gx = g
1
k+x and [f(x)] to table T
end
Send [k] and sorted table T to party B
In the evaluation phase, B obliviously learns an encryption [f(x)] for some
value [x] (obliviously to himself and to party A), given [k] and T , by running
Protocol 6. A and B obliviously evaluate the pseudo-random function gx = g
1
k+x
on [x], so that the result will be available in the clear only to B at the end of the
protocol. This knowledge allows B to \look up" the desired result in the table
received before by selecting the row of T that contains an encryption of f(x). As
party B does not know the key k in the clear, he cannot access other encryptions
in the table, since he cannot look up their positions in T .
Since the value gx is pseudo random, the proposed approach allows to use the
same table T prepared in the initialization phase for multiple queries. Thus, the
complexity of generating T can be amortized over a certain number of operations,
yielding to an adaptive protocol with good practical performance. However, if T
is used multiple times, there is a chance that a single value will be requested more
than once. This information will be leaked to party B. To limit this information
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ow, the table T can be updated periodically after a number of queries have been
performed. To this end, party A re-runs the initialization phase and provides
party B with the new table and a new key k0.
Protocol 6 Computing f(x) using OPRFs { Evaluation Step
Input: Party B: [x] with x 2 X
Output: Party B: [f(x)]
1: Party B:
Let r 2R Zn in [y] := [r(x+ k)] = ([x][k])r
Send [y] to party A
2: Party A:
y = Decrypt([y])
gy = g
(y 1)
Send gy to party B
3: Party B:
gx = g
r
y
Look up entry gx in T and obtain [f(x)]
5.1.1.1 Optimizations
As T can become very large, depending on the choices made for f and X , we
describe several optimizations which allow to decrease the size of T .
Table index. As each gx is a random value of approximately 1024 bits, but T
has at most jT j  21024 entries, it is sucient to choose only the least signicant
bits of gx as an index. For example, for realistic examples such as jT j = 210 it
suces to choose the 32 least signicant bits. This results in a great reduction
of communication. In the rare case that a collision occurs, we suggest to either
use more bits for the entries with a collision, or choose a new parameter k and
restart the initialization.
Statistical hiding. The size of the second column can be reduced as well. Let
!;  > 0 and r0; : : : ; r be random !-bit numbers, where ! is a security parameter.
Rather than storing an encryption of the value f(x) in the table T , it suces
to store a value f(x) + sx, where sx =
P
i=0 i  ri is a linear combination of
random values r0; : : : ; r. If we provide party B with encryptions [ri], and if the
values i are chosen pseudo-randomly, i.e., by extracting them as random chunks
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(of small bit-length) of the value gx, then party B can reconstruct the value
f(x) by encrypting the table entry in row with index gx and then subtracting
[sx] = [
P
i=0 iri]. As long as party B does not access more than  blinded
values from table T (which could give him a system of linear equations of the
form
P
i=0 i  ri), the values ri remain hidden and thus also the values f(x)
remain statistically hidden from B.
5.1.1.2 Security
In this section we sketch a security proof for the protocol for private function
evaluation presented in Protocol 6. Security for larger protocols, such as the
protocols from Sections 5.2.4, 8.3 and 8.4, follows from the composition theorem
for the semi-honest model [10, Theorem 7.3.3].
We consider the security of Protocol 6 for computing an encryption of [f(x)].
Both input and output of party A are ?. The inputs of party B are ([x]; [k]; T ),
while as output he learns [f(x)]. Recall that we have a homomorphic encryption
scheme, where party A knows the public and private key and party B knows the
public key. In addition to this, both parties know a public value g, which is a
generator of a subgroup of some nite eld Zp. The evaluation of the sub-protocol
is as follows:
 Party B generates a random r and sends [y] = [r(x+ k)] to party A.
 Party A decrypts [r(x+ k)], computes r(x + k) and sends v = g 1r(x+k) to
party B.1
 Party B computes vr = g 1k+x and obtains an encryption [f(x)] by selecting
entry g
1
k+x from table T .
Next we prove that the protocol given above privately computes (?; [x]) !
(?; [f(x)]). Party A's view ViewA(?) is fr(x + k)g. Here, ViewA(?) can be
simulated by a PPTA because r(x + k) is uniformly distributed in Zn and is
therefore statistically indistinguishable from a value chosen uniformly at random
from Zn. Therefore, the views are statistically indistinguishable which implies
that they are also computationally indistinguishable (see [10], Section 7.2.1.2).
Party B's view ViewB([x]; [k]; T ) consists of ([x]; [k]; T ; r; g
1
r(k+x) ; g
1
k+x ; [f(x]).
To simulate, rst construct a new view H1 by replacing [x] and [k] by [x
0] and
1Technically if gcd(r(x+ k); n) 6= 1, the protocol aborts (where n is the underlying modulus
of the group).
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[k0] in ViewB([x]), where x0; k0 are randomly chosen. Semantic security of the
Paillier encryption scheme guarantees that the two views ViewB([x]) and H1 are
indistinguishable. Subsequently, construct a new view H2 by replacing r, g
1
r(k+x)
and g
1
k+x . First, we replace r by r0 in H1, where r0 is randomly chosen. The
value g
1
r(k+x) can be replaced by g
1
r0(k0+x0) , where k0 and x0 are chosen uniformly
at random from Zn. Furthermore, we replace g
1
k+x with g
1
k0+x0 . Views H1 and
H2 are indistinguishable because (g
1
r(k+x) ; g
1
k+x ; r) and (g
1
r0(k0+x0) ; g
1
k0+x0 ; r0) are
identically distributed. This is due to the fact that g
1
r(k+x) implements a pseu-
dorandom function [24]. Finally, we create a view H3 where we replace T and
[f(x)] with a new table T 0 and a value [f(x0)]. The table T 0 is constructed as
follows: Create a table T 00 which contains values g 1k00+x00 in the rst colum, and
encryptions [f(x00)] in the second column, where the values k00 and x00 are random
elements. Let m be an integer chosen uniformly at random from f1; : : : ; jT jg. Re-
place the m-th row of T 00 with (g 1k0+x0 ; [f(x0]), where k0 and x0 are the random
values used to construct view H1;H2.
Now, the two views H3 and ViewB([x]; [k]; T ) are computationally indistin-
guishable. Note further that H3 can be generated from ([x]; g
1
k+x ) by a PPTA.
This shows that both views can eciently be simulated.
5.1.2 OT Construction
In this section we will show how the table look-up operation can signicantly be
improved by reducing the computational complexity, while accepting a slightly
increased communication complexity. In this section, when referring to a ho-
momorphic encryption, we exclusively use the DGK cryptosystem (see Section
3.4).
Creating and transmitting the full table in Section 5.1.1 is rather costly. The-
refore, we transform the lookup in a large table of size jT j into two lookups in
smaller tables of size t =
pjT j and one oblivious evaluation of some polynomial.
In the remainder of this section we assume that x is a positive value; this can
always be achieved by shifting the interval X = [xlow ;xup ] to X 0 = [0;xup xlow ].
For simplicity of presentation, we will further assume that the table T has 22d
entries, thus t =
pjT j = 2d. We will later relax this assumption. For a good per-
formance, we choose the parameter u of the DGK cryptosystem as the smallest
prime number such that u > jT j.
We rst split x into two values y and z which consist of the d most signicant
resp. least signicant bits of x, i.e. x = yt+z. Now, we perform two simultaneous
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y ~x
0 ~x0
1 ~x1
...
...
t  1 ~xt 1
Table 5.1: Table lookup for value y.
table lookups. In the rst lookup (e.g. see Table 5.1), the value y is mapped to
a value ~x 2 f~x0; : : : ; ~xt 1g, where the values ~x0; : : : ; ~xt 1 are chosen at random
from Zu. Next, polynomials Pz are generated in a way that on the evaluation
points ~x0; : : : ; ~xt 1 the polynomials take on values f(xi), i.e. Pz(~xy) = f(y t+z).
z Pz
0 P0
1 P1
...
...
t  1 Pt 1
Table 5.2: Table lookup for value z.
In the second lookup (see Table 5.2), the value z is used to select the polyno-
mial Pz which is nally evaluated on ~x to obtain the result [[f(x)]] = [[f(yt+z)]] =
[[Pz(~x)]] (see Table 5.3).
~x0 ~x1 . . . ~xt 1
P0(~x) f(x1) f(x2) . . . f(xt)
P1(~x) f(xt+1) f(xt+2) . . . f(x2t)
...
...
Pt 1(~x) f(xjT j t+1) f(xjT j t+2) . . . f(xjT j)
Table 5.3: New table lookup.
Thus, the full protocol (see Protocols 7 and 8) consists of the following steps,
which will be described in detail in the subsequent sections:
 (Oine): Prepare representation as polynomials (Step 1).
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 Extract the bits of [[x]] to obtain values y; z, with x = y  t+ z (Steps 2 and
3).
 Transfer values ~x and Pz with tables of size t using OT (Steps 4 and 5).
 Reconstruct the value [[T (x)]] (Step 6).
5.1.2.1 Representation as polynomials
We rst show how values ~xi and polynomials Pj , with i; j 2 f0; : : : ; t 1g, should
be chosen in order to allow an ecient reconstruction of an encryption of the
desired value f(x). This step will be done by party A in some initialization
phase (which could be performed oine).
In our protocols, party B holds an encryption [[x]] whereas party A assists
in the computations. Party A will therefore choose polynomials and values ~xi.
Initially, party A chooses values ~x0; : : : ; ~xt 1 uniformly at random from Zu (with
~xi 6= ~xj for i 6= j). Each of these values will be assigned to one value y 2
f0; : : : ; t   1g. Choosing these values at random allows to later reveal some
values ~xi to party B as long as the mapping f0; : : : ; t   1g ! f~x0; : : : ; ~xt 1g
remains hidden. Revealing these values to party B is crucial for the performance
of our solution, as this allows party B to compute powers ~xj without interaction
with party B. Next, the polynomials Pz will be determined using polynomial
interpolation. For each value z 2 f0; : : : ; t   1g, party A computes coecients
a0; : : : ; at of a polynomial Pz(x) =
Pt
j=0 ajx
j in a way that Pz(~xj) = f(tj + z).
Since the polynomials will be chosen of degree t, there will be one degree of
freedom left. This will be used to add additional randomness to the process,
thus we demand that Pz(~xt) = rt for values ~xt =2 f~x0; : : : ; ~xt 1g and rt which are
randomly chosen for each polynomial Pz. Note that, due to the random choice of
the interpolation points ~xi, also the coecients aj appear to be randomly chosen
from Zu.
Before submitting a polynomial Pz to party B, we encrypt some of the coe-
cients. Encrypting some of the coecients aj will allow party B merely to com-
pute an encryption of the desired value [[T (x)]]. We therefore choose +1 random
values 0; : : : ;  2R Zu and replace the rst + 1 coecients a0; : : : ; a of each
polynomial Pz by j := aj + j mod u. A full representation of a polynomial Pz
then consists of the values 0; : : : ; ; a+1; : : : ; at and encryptions [[0]]; : : : ; [[]].
Note that to prevent party B from guessing the coecients a0; : : : ; a, we need
to make sure that  + 1  != log2 u (where ! denotes a statistical security pa-
rameter). For example, for ! = 80 bit and u being 16 bit, we require   4.
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For practical implementations, this is typically already the case, since a set of
polynomials Pz and evaluation points ~xi can (and should, for eciency reasons)
be reused  times. However, if party B learns more than  values ~xi and if  is
small, he can guess the result of the polynomial evaluation, e.g. test all values
Pz(x) =
Pt
j=0 ajx
j = v, with v 2 Zu, and then solve the system of linear equa-
tions for the values 0; : : : ; . Thus, in order to prevent this kind of attack, we
allow each set of polynomials to be used at most  times; once this happens, a
new set of polynomials must be prepared. Note that, naturally party A could as
well encrypt all coecients. However, more encrypted coecients means more
communication and computation during the initialization, thus we only encrypt
+ 1 coecients.
Protocol 7 Optimized table look-up (Part 1)
Input: Party B: [[x]]
Output: Party B: [[T (x)]]
Initialization:
1: Party A: Generate values ~xi and polynomials Pi, prepare tables U1;U2;P
(indices, values ~xi and list of encrypted polynomials) and send [[0]]; : : : ; [[]]
and P to party B
Evaluation:
2: Party B: Choose r 2R Zu
r1; r2 2R f0; : : : ; t  1g.
[[a]] = [[x+ r]]
Construct a garbled circuit C which realizes the following functionality:
Garbled Circuit C
Input: a
b1 := a  r, b2 := a  r + u
if (b1 < 0) then
b := b2
else
b := b1
end
Set z := b mod t, y := (b  z)=t
o1 = (y   r1) mod t
o2 = (z   r2) mod t
Output: o1; o2
Send C and [[a]] to party A
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5.1.2.2 Detailed protocol description
The oblivious table look-up is presented in Protocols 7 and 8; it consists of the
following steps:
Initialization. In a rst step, party A computes values ~xi, polynomials and
values i. Next, party A prepares tables U1;U2 and a list P which will be used
in the oblivious table look-ups. The list P contains all polynomials in random
order. Table U1 contains the values ~xi which is selected by value y (see Table
5.1). Table U2 is used to transfer the index of a polynomial in P (the value z in
Table 5.2). Both the list P and values [[0]]; : : : ; [[]] can be transferred at any
time (e.g. ahead of the evaluation phase). Tables U1 and U2 will then be used in
steps 3 and 4 of the protocol.
Split the value x, compute y; z. In steps 2 and 3 of Protocols 7 and 8,
party B holds an encryption [[x]] and should obtain two values of y; z such that
x = ty + z. For eciency reasons, at this point we use garbled circuits. The
straightforward alternative at this point would be to keep the values under ho-
momorphic encryption, and perform all binary operations on the encrypted bits.
However, garbled circuits yield to much better performance for these kind of ope-
rations. We further use the extended oblivious transfer protocol [57] in order to
transfer large chunks of symmetric keys for the garbled circuits. The extended
oblivious transfer protocol builds on the OT protocol presented in [26]. This is,
party A throws random coins and randomly requests garbled circuit keys accor-
ding to these coins. These keys will later then be used in Protocol 7 to construct
the circuit. Transferring the keys beforehand can be done this way, since the
distribution of the inputs to our circuits is close to values with random bits (in
fact, they are random values from Zu). In the circuit, we rst remove the ad-
ditional blinding factor, by subtracting r from the input a. This computation
is performed modulo u, and is realized as two addition circuits in binary 2th
complement representation. A multiplexer is used to select the correct value b1
or b2 according to the sign bit of b1. The d least signicant bits of b are then
output as value o2 under another additive blinding, while the d most signicant
bits of b are output as value o1.
Implementing the table lookups. After Step 3 of Protocol 8, party A holds
the values y and z, additively blinded with values r1; r2 which are known to party
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Protocol 8 Optimized table look-up (Part 2)
Protocol 7 continued:
3: Party A:
a = Decrypt([[a]])
Evaluate the circuit C on input a, obtain outputs o1; o2
for i = 1; 2
// if i = 1 send value ~x (table U1)
// if i = 2 transfer index (i) (table U2)
4: Party A:
// Prepare the rotated list for table Ui:
m0 = Ui(oi + 0 mod t)
m1 = Ui(oi + 1 mod t)
. . .
mt 1 = Ui(oi + (t  1) mod t)
5: Party A:
Request value mri using OT
end
// Party B now holds polynomial Pz and a value ~x
6: Party A:
for i 2 f0; : : : ; g
[[ai~x
i]] = [[i + i]]
~xi
end
for i 2 f+ 1; : : : ; tg
[[ai~x
i]] = Encrypt(ai~x
i)
end
[[T (x)]] = [[Pz(~x)]] = [[
Pt
i=0 ai~x
i]]
B (thus y = (o1 + r1) mod t and z = (o2 + r2) mod t). The goal is now to let
party B learn the values Pz and ~x, without revealing y or z.
To this end, Steps 4 and 5 in Protocol 8 depict how to extend a blackbox
version of OT to allow for additively blinded values as inputs (e.g. see [58, 59]).
Party A rst rotates the tables Ui according to the values oi (i 2 f1; 2g). The
rotated lists will then be used as input for some OT protocol to obtain the correct
output. When party B requests the values ri, he clearly obtains the correct
result, since e.g. for i = 1 the value at position r1 is table entry U1(o1 + r1) =
U1(y   r1 + r1) = U1(y) = ~xy.
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Since we allow each set of polynomials to be used  times, we do not use
the polynomials as direct input to the OT protocol. Instead, party A uses a
permutation  to permute the set of polynomials P0; : : : ; Pt 1 and transfers this
list P := P(0); : : : ; P(t 1) to party B during the initialization phase. Party B will
stay oblivious about the correct order of the polynomials, since the coecients
of the polynomials appear to be random elements of Zu. As input for the OT
protocol, party A uses the permuted list of indices (0); : : : ; (t 1). This allows
party B to learn the correct index (z) of polynomial Pz in the list P. Using the
same set of polynomials multiple times signicantly reduces the communication
overhead. At the same time party B has a small chance to see if there was one
value which was queried more than once (however, party B will get no information
which value was actually queried more than once).
As it was explained before, the parties will run Steps 4 and 5 of Protocol 8 two
times. One time with input o1 and table U1 = (i; ~xi)i2I to obtain a value ~x, and
a second time with input o2 and table U2 = (i; (i))i2I (with I = f0; : : : ; t  1g)
which allows B to select the right polynomial Pz from the permuted list P. A poly-
nomial Pz will be represented by the values 0; : : : ; ; a+1; : : : ; at; thus, we refer
to a polynomial Pz as the concatenation of the values 0; : : : ; ; a+1; : : : ; at.
Reconstructing the value [[T (x)]]. After party B has learned a value ~x and
an encrypted polynomial ~Py he needs to reconstruct the value [[T (x)]]. Party
B rst computes encryptions of the coecients of Pz, i.e. [[ai]] = [[i + i]]
for i 2 f0; : : : ; g, by using the homomorphic property. Next, he encrypts the
remaining coecients a+1; : : : ; ak. Finally, he computes [[T (x)]] = [[Pz(~x)]] =
[[
Pt
i=0 ai~x
i]] =
Qt
i=0 [[ai]]
xi . Note that the encryptions in Step 6 of Protocol 8
can be performed very eciently. Only one of these encryptions needs to be (re-
)randomized, while for the remaining ones it suces to compute a deterministic
encryption (see Section 2.2.3.3).
Dynamic table size. Naturally, the size of table T does not need to be res-
tricted to 22d. In fact our scheme allows arbitrary table sizes. In this case, we
compute t1 = b0:5 log2 jT jc, and choose a minimal t2 such that t1t2  jT j. Party
A now computes t1 dierent polynomials of degree t2. It is straightforward to
modify the rest of Protocols 7 and 8 accordingly.
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5.2 Secure Computations on Non-Integer Values
In this section we present a framework which allows two parties to perform se-
cure computations on values from some interval D = [ `; +`]  R. Note that
we describe the framework in its full generality; in case that computations are
performed only on a limited set of numbers (e.g., only on probabilities in the
interval [0; 1]) further optimizations are possible.
5.2.1 Data Representation
We start by giving a description of how values from the real domain D will be
represented. We require the representation to meet the following conditions:
 First, the scheme should allow a representation as integer values, in order
to use ecient methods from generic Secure Multiparty Computation for
some sub-problems.
 Second, the representation should have a similar behavior as oating point
arithmetic: the precision for numbers close to 0 should be higher than for
numbers far away from 0. This is desirable in order to achieve a bounded
relative error when representing both very small and rather big numbers.
 The data encoding should allow us to perform certain arithmetic operations
directly on the encoded values.
Our solution to this problem builds on the work of Kingsbury and Rayner [60].
We use a logarithmic representation for the numbers in the interval D = [ ; ]
with  > 0. Let S 2 N be a scaling factor, B > 0 a suitable base for some
logarithm and C be a constant with logB(C) > 0:5=S + logB(). We represent
a value x 2 D as a tuple (x; x; x). Here, x 2 f0; 1g is a boolean value
indicating whether the represented number is zero, i.e., x = 1 if x is not equal
to zero and x = 0 otherwise. Similarly, x encodes the sign and will be kept
as a boolean, i.e., x = 0 if x  0 and x = 1 otherwise. If x = 1 we compute
an encoding x of the absolute value as x = d S  logB( jxjC )c, where dc denotes
rounding to the nearest integer. Note that the choice of C ensures that x > 0
for all x 2 [ ; ]. In case of x = 0 both x and x will be set to 1 and can later
contain arbitrary values. If we limit the space for the values x to some interval
[1; 2 1] by storing x as -bit number, we can exactly represent a set of 2+1 1
distinct numbers from D .
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We denote the representation of any given x 2 D in L := f0; 1g  f0; 1g 
f1; : : : ; 2   1g by x. The backward transformation L ! D is given by
(x; x; x) 7! x  (1  2x)  C B( x=S):
5.2.2 Parameters
According to the desired level of accuracy and the size  for the interval of
represented numbers, the parameters S;B;C and  can be adjusted. We rst
note that for each pair (S1; B1) and a base B2 there exists a unique S2 such that
S1 logB1(x) = S2 logB2(x) for all x 2 R+. Thus it suces to consider only one
xed base B and adjust the parameters S;C and  accordingly.
The relative distance x=x between two subsequent numbers in D , which
can exactly be represented in our encoding, is
x=x =
C B x=S   C B (x+1)=S
C B x=S = 1 B
 1=S ; (5.1)
and thus depends only on B and S. To achieve a xed maximum relative error
x=x it thus suces to x a base B and compute S as S =  (logB(1 x=x)) 1.
For example, for a base B = 2 and scaling factor S = 100, the maximal relative
representation error is given by 6:9  10 3.
Other factors to consider when choosing the parameters are the smallest and
the greatest positive value which can be represented; in our encoding we have
C B (2 1)=S for the minimal and C B 1=S for the maximal positive value. As
the scheme represents numbers from the interval D , we choose C as C >  B1=S .
Thus, for most choices of S and B we can let C  . For xed S;B and C, we
can set the parameter  to adjust the smallest number which can be represented
by the scheme. For example, for parameter values of C = 1; B = 2; S = 100 and
 = 16 the smallest positive value that can be represented is 5:25  10 198. In
addition,  inuences the precision of the arithmetic, i.e., the number of values
from D which can be represented exactly.
There are no general guidelines on how to choose the parameters; they must
be chosen according to the problem domain. Usually, this process involves an
experimental analysis of the propagation of errors during the computation (for
an example see Section 8.5).
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5.2.3 Arithmetic Operations
We will now describe how to perform basic arithmetic operations on encoded
values x; y 2 L.
5.2.3.1 Multiplication and Division
Due to the logarithmic representation it is quite easy to compute an encoding
xy of the product x  y, given encodings x and y. Let C2 = dS  logB(C)c. The
function
LPROD(x; y) = LPROD((x; x; x); (y; y; y)) (5.2)
= (xy; x  y; x + y   C2)
= xy
achieves the desired functionality. Note that LPROD(x; y) = xy: If either x = 0
or y = 0, then also xy is an encoding of zero, and if both x; y 6= 0 then
xy = x + y   C2
=  S logB(x=C)  S logB(y=C)  S logB(C)
=  S logB(xy=C):
Dividing two numbers x; y 2 L with y 6= 0 is similar:
LDIV(x; y) = LDIV((x; x; x); (y; y; y)) (5.3)
= (x; x  y; x   y + C2)
= x=y:
5.2.3.2 Addition and Subtraction
Given x and y, computing x+ y and x  y, which will be denoted by LSUM and
LSUB in the sequel, is more involved. We rst note that in order to compute
a subtraction, it suces to swap the sign y of y and then perform an addition.
Thus we limit ourselves to describe the addition. Let 1; : : : ; 4 2 f0; 1g, where
1 =
(
1; if x < y
0; otherwise,
(5.4)
2 =
(
1; if x = y
0; otherwise,
(5.5)
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3 := x  y; and (5.6)
4 := xy: (5.7)
The new value x+y can be obtained by
x+y = :((23) + :(x + y)): (5.8)
Furthermore,
x+y = MUX2(yy + xx; t), with (5.9)
t = MUX1(xx + (:x)y; yy + (:y)x): (5.10)
For x; y 6= 0 with the same sign, x+y can be computed using the Kingsbury-
Rayner-Formula [60]:
x+y = y   dS logB(1 +B(y x)=S)c: (5.11)
If the signs of x and y dier and x 6= y, we let z =  jx   yj and compute
x y = i   dS logB(1 Bz=S)c; (5.12)
where i := y if 1 = 0 and i := x, otherwise. The case x = y will be handled
implicitly in the next section (Secure Operations 5.2.4).
5.2.3.3 Maximum and Minimum
Other operations which are required frequently in arithmetic computations are
comparisons. These will be integrated to our framework in form of the functions
LMAX and LMIN, where e.g. LMAX(x; y) computes the maximum of x and
y. In particular, we need to compare two log-encoded probabilities x and y. This
can easily be done by comparing the values x and y, since smaller log-encoded
values in fact represent larger values from R. Again we note that a LMIN
operation can be computed from LMAX by swapping the signs x; y of both
log-encoded values x; y. To compute the maximum, we use the transformation
T(z) = T(z; z; z) =
8><>:
2+1   z; if z = z = 1
2; if z = 0
z; if z = 1; z = 0;
(5.13)
and let  = 1 if T(x) < T(y) and  = 0 otherwise. Now it holds
LMAX(x; y) = (x  y) + y:
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5.2.4 Secure Operations
In this section we describe how to perform secure computations on values that are
represented in the encoding described in Section 5.2.1. We consider a two-party
scenario, where computation is interactively performed by partiesA and B. Party
A has generated secret keys in the past and is thus the only party who has access
to the private key. We encrypt and perform computations with each component of
x 2 L separately. While it is possible to use homomorphic encryption to encrypt
the ags, we will use garbled circuits to compute with the boolean ags x and x,
whereas the value x will be encrypted using homomorphic encryption. In this
setting the keys Kx and Kx representing the bits x and x will be stored by
party A. For each arithmetic operation, party B creates a circuit on demand and
sends it to party A. We will denote an encryption of x by ex = (x; x; [x]). As
homomorphic encryption scheme, we use either the Paillier or DGK cryptosystem
(thus, in this section h  i refers to either Paillier or DGK).
5.2.4.1 Multiplication and Division
The arithmetic operations LPROD and LDIV can be computed in a straight-
forward manner by utilizing the properties of homomorphic encryption (see Sec-
tion 3.3.1) to implement Equations (5.2) and (5.3). The product operation re-
quires evaluation of two single garbled gates:
fxy = LPROD(ex; ey)
= (fxygGC; fx  ygGC; hxihyihC2i 1):
For y 6= 0 the division can be computed by:
gx=y = LDIV(ex; ey)
= (x; fx  ygGC; hxihyi 1hC2i):
Subtraction. As noted above, the operation LSUB can be transformed into a
sum LSUM by evaluating a single garbled gate:
]x  y = LSUB(ex; ey)
= LSUB((x; x; hxi); (y; y; hyi))
= LSUM((x; x; hxi); (y; f:ygGC; hyi)):
66 Secure Computations using Logarithmic Encoding
5.2.4.2 Addition
In the following we describe the operation LSUM that securely adds two en-
crypted values ex and ey. The ags x+y and x+y of the result can be computed
in a straightforward manner according to Equations (5.8) and (5.9) using small
circuits with 2 and 9 gates each. The values 1; 2 of Equation 5.4 and 5.5 can
be obtained by using standard circuits for comparison and equality testing, while
3 and 4 can be computed using one garbled gate each.
The main diculty when computing the sum ]x+ y of two encrypted valuesex; ey consists of computing hx+yi. This can be achieved by rst computing a
value hzi = hx   yi and then evaluating the function
f+(z) = dS logB(1 +Bz=S)c
if x = y, according to Eq. (5.11), and
f (z) = dS logB(1 B jzj=S)c
if x 6= y, according to Equation (5.12). Thus, hx+yi can be computed once
encryptions hxi, hyi, hf+(z)i and hf (z)i are available. Since all computations
need to be performed in the encrypted domain, we need to evaluate Eq. (5.11) and
Eq. (5.12) simultaneously, and later select the correct result. Thus, we compute
four boolean ags that select which of the values hxi, hyi, hf+(z)i and hf (z)i
need to be added to each other. For this reason, we compute
x = fx(:3 + 31 + :x)gGC;
y = fy(:x + 3:1)gGC;
f+(z) = f(:3)4gGC and
f (z) = f34gGC:
Note that z takes on values in the interval f 2   1; : : : ; 2   1g. The nal
encryption hx+yi can then be computed as
hx+yi = (x  hxi)(y  hyi)(f+(z)  hf+(z)i)(f (z)  hf (z)i); (5.14)
where  denotes a specialized protocol which outputs an encryption of zero if
the boolean ag i = 0, and otherwise returns an encryptions of the second
operand. The protocol is presented in Section 5.2.5, Protocol 9. For example,
for x = y = 1 and x = y = 0, it holds that x = 1, y = 0, f+(z) = 1 and
f (z) = 0, thus in this case Eq. (5.14) corresponds to Eq. (5.11), addition of
two positive values.
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Computations of hf+(z)i and hf (z)i have to be done in a way that no party
gains any information about z or f(z). Since both functions are very dicult
to compute analytically on encrypted values, we compute them by running the
lookup-table based primitive described in Section 5.1. Thus the accuracy of the
secure LSUM operation mainly depends on the size  of the table used in this
primitive (see Section 5.2.2).
5.2.4.3 Maximum and Minimum
We construct a basic block LMAX(ex; ey) that returns encryptions of the maxi-
mum of x and y. For an encrypted log value ez, an encryption hT(z)i of the
transformed value of z dened in Eq. (5.13) can be computed by
hT(z)i = (fzzgGC  (h2+1ih zi))(fz(:z)gGC  hzi)(f:zgGC  h2i):
Let CMP denote a secure comparison protocol as described in Section 3.3.2,
i.e. given two tuples with encryptions of (a1; b1); (a2; b2) it outputs an encryption
of the maximumm 2 fa1; b1g along with an encryption of bm. Then an encryption
of the maximum can be computed by
LMAX(x; y) = CMP((hT(x)i; hxi); (hT(y)i; hyi)):
5.2.4.4 Optimizations
Computations on non-negative values. In case that computations are per-
formed only on positive values (such as probabilities in the interval [0; 1]), we can
further simplify the representation of values, as x will always be set to one and
it is not necessary to compute the value f . Thus, computing the new sign can
be omitted, while computation of the ag  and value  can be simplied.
Computations on strictly positive values. In case that all values are strictly
greater than zero the complexity of the proposed protocols decreases even further.
We can omit computation of both ags  and , and the computation of x+y
can be reduced to x+y = x + f+(z). The same optimizations apply, in case
that only party B provides input values in the range [0; 1] (and the second party
has inputs strictly greater than zero). In this case, party B can store the ag 
in plain, omitting the computation of garbled gates and multiplication with x
and f+.
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Protocol 9 GC-ag Multiplication protocol.
Input: Party A: x; Party B: 0; 1; hyi
Output: Party B: hx  yi
1: Party B:
Let C 2R f0; 1g, r 2R Zu
if (C == 0)
D = H(K1); E = H(K0)
else
D = H(K0); E = H(K1)
end
hy0i = hyir
Send D;E; hy0i to A
2: Party A:
if H(Kx) == D
Send hz0i = hy0ih0i and hz1i = h0i to B
else
Send hz0i = h0i and hz1i = hy0ih0i to B
end
3: Party B:
hKx  yi = hzCir 1
5.2.5 Multiplication protocol
We present a short protocol which allows to multiply a binary value x, held
as garbled circuit key Kx by party A (with x 2 f0; 1g), and a homomorphic
encryption hyi, held by party B. During the protocol, party A stays oblivious
about y and the meaning of Kx (i.e. whether x = 1 or x = 0). Party B shall
not learn the value y, nor which of the two garbled keys for x is held by party A.
Protocol 9 depicts the steps performed by party A and B.
First, party B uses a hash function H() to compute a hash of the two garbled
keys for the value x, denoted by K0 and K1. Furthermore, in Step 1 we use
multiplicative blinding (see Section 3.2.2) to hide the value y. Party B then
sends these values to party A. Note that in it suces to send only the rst bits
of D and E, on average this is about two bits each. In Step 2, party A computes
a hash of the value Kx and according to this computes two encryptions z0; z1
which she subsequently sends to party B. This allows party B to compute the
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nal result hKx  yi in Step 3.
In the protocol, two encryptions need to be performed, while the communi-
cation complexity consists of 3 encryptions being sent.
5.3 Discussion: Alternative LSUM Implementations
A natural question to ask is, whether LSUM can be implemented as eciently
as in Section 5.2.4.2 by using standard SMC methods. In this section we describe
three arguments which give rise to the assumption that the function
dlogB(1 +B(x y)=S)c
needed in LSUM at a crucial point belongs to the group of functions which
can be computed more eciently by using table look-ups than by arithmetic or
binary operations.
 Computing dlogB(1 +B(x y)=S)c step by step. As a rst idea, one might
try to rst compute y = ez with z = x   y and then compute log(1 + y).
Computing y = ez would be possible for small values of z using the Taylor
series of the exponential function. However, the values z appearing in our
protocols are typically in the range [ 500; 500] which produces results y out
of any practical bounds. Furthermore, the implementation of the function
log(1 + y) still seems to be more ecient when done using table look-ups
(e.g. see the suggestions for implementing the log function in IEEE 754
arithmetic [61]).
 Using Taylor series to directly approximate dlogB(1 +B(x y)=S)c. Un-
fortunately, the resulting series shows bad convergence properties. For
example, when evaluating the Taylor series at x0 = 0, the series only
converges in the interval [ 2; 2] with suciently good accuracy. Further-
more, securely computing the required powers (x   y)k through secure
multiplications is more expensive than doing a single table look-up. The
above two arguments combined suggest that a table-lookup is the best sui-
table salutation for the problem.
 Implementing the table look-up using garbled circuits. While a direct imple-
mentation using Garbled Circuits and a compiler like Fairplay [44] would
have been our rst choice, it does not oer any advantages in our context.
To perform a table-based LSUM operation, we would have to hardcode
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all table entries in a circuit. In this case, the number of gates to be evalua-
ted just to perform the LSUM operations could be roughly estimated by
[size of tables]  [bit length entries]  [number of additions], which is beyond
practical realization. Thus, we do not expect any improvement when using
garbled circuits in a straightforward manner.
Chapter 6
Secure Computations using
Floating Point Representation
In this chapter we present an implementation which performs secure computa-
tions on values encoded according to the IEEE 754 oating point standard. This
answers a long standing open question in the context of secure computations
armatively: We show that it is indeed possible to perform secure computations
on encrypted oating point values. Furthermore, we describe ne-tuned and
ecient protocols which operate on such encrypted oating point values.
Reasons to use oating point values over log-encodings as presented in the
previous chapter can be manifold. Compared to the approach of Chapter 5, we
see various situations where an implementation of the oating point standard can
be advantageous: While the table-driven design in Chapter 5 yields to impressive
performance when computing with rather small numbers (e.g., with a precision of
up to 20 bits), it is clear that for larger values the tables become large and dicult
to handle. The tables grow exponentially in the bitlength of the operands, while
the implementation in this chapter only has a quadratic complexity. Another
advantage of our implementation is a straightforward and easy to implement
exception handling. As we will see, we can detect division by zero, over- and
underows at a marginal extra cost in our protocols.
6.1 IEEE 754 Floating Point
We will start by briey reviewing the IEEE oating point standard [61]. The
standard species various number formats, operations and exception handling
routines. In this chapter we restrict ourselves to describing how to securely
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represent the binary formats, e.g. oating point values with 32 or 64 bits of
total bitlength. Each such value x is stored as a triplet consisting of integers
sx;mx; ex such that x = sx  mx  2ex . The rst value is the sign, being either
 1 or 1. The second value is a signicand with either 23 or 52 valid bits. The
bitlength of the signicand will be denoted as `. Each signicand is represented
in its normalized form, i.e., in the unique binary representation with a leading
1, followed by ` signicand bits. When storing the signicand it suces to only
keep the ` remaining bits while the leading 1 can be omitted. The exponent has
either 8 or 11 bits, this bitlength will be denoted by .
The IEEE 754 standard species some special values, for which the exponents
e = 0 and e = 2 1 are reserved. These consist of Zero, Innity and Not A Num-
ber. In the context of SMC, instead of representing these special values explicitly,
for eciency reasons we rather aim at detecting situations where computations
yield to a special value. When an arithmetic operation yields an Innity or Not
A Number as result, an exception is triggered. The standard denes the following
exceptions that can occur when handling oating point values:
 Invalid operation (e.g., square root of a negative number),
 Division by zero,
 Overow (a result is too large to be represented correctly),
 Underow (result is very small and outside the normal range),
 Inexact (the normalized result of an operation can not be represented
exactly, e.g. in case of an underow).
In this thesis, we limit ourselves to explain how to compute a ag indicating
whether such an exception occurred and discuss how to handle it.
6.2 Secure Protocols
When describing the secure protocols, we try to be conform with the oating
point standard wherever possible. We will start by giving a protocol for the nor-
malization operation, followed by protocols for the basic arithmetic operations in
Sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.4. For a better representation, these protocols do not include
handling of exceptions and special values such as Innity or Not A Number (see
section 6.1). In Section 6.2.5 we explain how to modify the protocols to allow for
a basic exception handling.
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We use an additively homomorphic encryption scheme to encrypt the values
sign sx, signicand mx and exponent ex of any oating point value x. To ensure
correctness, we encrypt the implicit 1 of each signicand along with the `-bit
oating point signicand. Thus in our implementation, ` will be the normal si-
gnicand length plus one. The special value Zero is encoded in a similar way
as in the oating point standard, i.e. through mx = 0 and ex = 0. The homo-
morphic encryption allows to perform arithmetic operations such as addition and
subtraction directly on encrypted values. At a key point of our construction we
use garbled circuits. Garbled circuits typically require more communication and
are less ecient when performing arithmetic operations on large values. Howe-
ver, for operations that need to access single bits, such as in the normalization
or integer comparison, they allow for most ecient protocols.
All protocols in this chapter are given in the same setting as in Chapter 5:
We assume that all protocols are run by a semi-honest party B, whereas party A
holds the private key for a homomorphic encryption scheme. Party A only assists
in the computations, e.g. when a value needs to be decrypted, or she evaluates a
garbled circuit created by party B. In the protocols we use a parameter , which
can be seen as a statistical security parameter (e.g., choose  > 80).
6.2.1 Normalization
Protocol 10 Normalization with extraction of sign
Input: ([m]; [e])
Output: ([sz]; [mz]; [ez])
1: Choose r 2R f0; : : : ; 2++1+g, r0 2R f0; : : : ; 2+`g
r00 2R f0; : : : ; 2+g, r000 2R f0; 1g
2: Compute [v] = [(m+ 2) + 2+2e  r],
3: Construct a garbled circuit C as depicted in Protocol 11
28: Send C and [v] to party A
29: Party A: Decrypt v, compute ~v = v mod 2+1+, evaluate C on ~v
Send encryptions [sout]; [mout]; [eout] to party B
30: [sz] = [2(sout  r000)  1]
31: [mz] = [mout   r0]
32: [ez] = [eout   r00]
We rst describe a secure protocol which allows to normalize values, i.e. which
produces a oating point number in the representation according to the IEEE
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oating point standard. This protocol will be run each time an arithmetic ope-
ration occurred. This is necessary because arithmetic operations produce results
which do not comply with the standardized representation described in Section
6.2. In particular, the signicand of the result of each operation will normally
have a bitlength of more than ` bits and needs to be adjusted to the exponent.
Protocol 11 Garbled Circuit for signed normalization protocol
4: Input: ~v
5: // Remove blinding:
6: v = (~v + (r mod 2+1+)) mod 2+1+
7: m = vf1;:::;+1g// Bits 1 to + 1 ! signicand
8: e = vf+2;:::;+1+g// Remaining Bits ! exponent
9: if (m > 2) then // Recover sign and abs. value
10: m := m mod 2,  = 1 // positive sign
11: else
12:  = 0 // Overow ! negative
13: Set bit z0 = 0
14: for i = 1 to  // Compute m := 2  m
15: zi := OR(zi 1;mi), mi = XOR(zi 1;mi)
16: end
17: end
18: Set d+1 = 0 // Find leading 1
19: for j =  to 1
20: dj = OR(mj ; dj 1)
21: end
22: Compute ~e =
P
i=1 dj // Position of leading 1
23: sout = r
000  
24: mnew =
P`
i=1 2
i 1m~e `+i
25: mout = r
0 +mnew
26: if (mnew == 0) then
eout = r
00
else
eout = r
00 + (e+ ~e  `)
end
27: Output: sout;mout; eout
As input the protocol has a signicand m and exponent e. We describe two
protocols that do the normalization: Protocol 10 takes as input a signicand [m]
and exponent [e], where the signicand can be negative, i.e. [m] contains the sign
of the signicand. This is the case when running normalization after an addi-
tion/subtraction. After a multiplication or division operation, the normalization
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protocol given in Protocol 12 is run. Here, the signicand is always unsigned,
thus in this case the protocol is a bit simpler than Protocol 10. Both protocols
accept inputs m of bitlength  = 2` bits, the theoretic maximal deviation from
the standard after performing one arithmetic operation, and output normalized
signicands of size ` bits. Since the two protocols are very similar, we limit our-
selves to describe only the more complex protocol for normalization of signed
values, Protocol 10.
Initially, in lines 1-3, party B uses additive blinding to hide the input values
m and e. Next he creates a garbled circuit as depicted in Protocol 11, and sends
both to party A (line 28). In the garbled circuit, rst the blinding factor r is
removed (line 6) and the original values m; e are reconstructed (line 7-8). In line
9 we check if m > 2. This is the case if and only if the signicand was positive
before adding 2 in line 2. Otherwise we compute 2   m, which in this case
corresponds to the absolute value of m.
Lines 18-21 compute a bit array d which has leading zeros followed by bits
with value one, where the position of the rst bit value one in d coincides with
the leading one in m. Next, we compute a value ~e =
P
i=1 dj . More ecient than
using  binary adders is to use a multiplexer construction. Such a construction
is able to nd the rst value di with di = 1 with at most  multiplexers. For
simplicity of notation we use the additive notation. The nal output bits ofP`
i=1 2
i 1m~e `+i can again be computed most eciently using ` -1-Multiplexers.
Note that for bit values mi, where i  0, a value mi = 0 will be inserted. This
is the case if the signicand is small (e.g. after a Subtraction), and needs to be
shifted to the left.
Finally, in lines 30-32, party B removes the blinding factors and computes
the nal result. Note that we use  to denote the bitwise XOR operation, thus
2(sout  r000)  1 maps the binary value sout  r000 to f 1; 1g.
Complexity. During the protocol 7 values need to be encrypted, while one
value is decrypted. The garbled circuit has approximately 2 + (` + 6) + 3
gates, e.g. for ` = 24,  = 48,  = 8 and  = 80 this results in a circuit with
approximately 1650 gates.
6.2.2 Subtraction and Addition
Subtraction and addition of oating point values ([sx]; [mx]; [ex]), ([sy]; [my]; [ey])
are rather complex operations. Protocol 13 depicts the secure operations perfor-
med by party B in order to add or subtract encrypted values to obtain the result
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Protocol 12 Normalization for unsigned signicands
Input: ([m]; [e])
Output: ([mz]; [ez])
1: Choose r 2R f0; : : : ; 2++g, r0 2R f0; : : : ; 2+`g, r00 2R f0; : : : ; 2+g
2: Compute [v] = [m+ 2+1e  r],
3: Construct a garbled circuit C which realizes the functionality as follows:
4: Input: ~v
5: // Remove blinding:
6: v = (~v + (r mod 2+)) mod 2+
7: m = vf1;:::;g// Bits 1 to  ! signicand
8: e = vf+1;:::;+g// Remaining Bits ! exponent
9: Set d+1 = 0 // Find leading 1
10: for j =  to 1
11: dj = OR(mj ; dj 1)
12: end
13: Compute ~e =
P
i=1 dj // Position of leading 1
14: mnew =
P`
i=1 2
i 1m~e `+i
15: mout = r
0 +mnew
16: if (mnew == 0) then
17: eout = r
00
18: else
19: eout = r
00 + (e+ ~e  `)
20: end
21: Output: mout; eout
22: Send C and [v] to party A
23: Party A: Decrypt v, compute ~v = v mod 2+1+ and evaluate C on ~v
24: Send encryptions [mout]; [eout] to party B
25: [mz] = [mout   r0]
26: [ez] = [eout   r00]
([sz]; [mz]; [ez]). For this, the sign value is multiplied to the signicand (line 28).
Before we can add the two signicands, they need to be adjusted to the same ex-
ponent (lines 26-28). For this, we rst select the value mmax that belongs to the
larger exponent. This can be done using a value  with  = 1 if ex < ey and  = 0
otherwise. Next, we compute a shift value shift, such that shift = [2abs(ex ey)] if
abs(ex   ey) < `, and shift = 0 otherwise. This shift value is multiplied to the
signicand that belongs to the smaller exponent. In order to determine the value
shift as well as the value , indicating the larger exponent, a garbled circuit as
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Protocol 13 Addition and Subtraction
Input: ([sx]; [mx]; [ex]); ([sy]; [my]; [ey])
Output: ([sz]; [mz]; [ez])
1: Choose r 2R f0; : : : ; 22+2g, r0 2R f0; : : : ; 22+g, r00; r000 2R f0; 1g
2: [v] = [ex + 2
ey   r]
3: Construct a garbled circuit C as depicted in Protocol 14
24: Send C, [v] to party A
25: Party A: Decrypt [v], compute ~v = v mod 22, evaluate C and send encryp-
tions [2o]; [p]; [q] to party B
26: [shift] = [2di] = [2o  2 r0 ]  [ p r00] // shift = 2o r0   z
27: [] = [q  r000] // Recover 
28: [m0x] = [sx]  [mx], [m0y] = [sy]  [my]
29: [mmax] = ([m
0
x]  [])  ([m0y]  [1  ])
30: [mmin] = [m
0
x +m
0
y  mmax]
31: [m0] = [mmax]  ([mmin]  [shift])
32: [e0] = ([ex]  [])  ([ey]  [1  ])
33: ([sz]; [mz]; [ez]) = Normalize([m
0]; [e0])
depicted in Protocol 14 is used. The circuit rst recomputes the two exponents
ex; ey, which have been additively blinded by party B (see lines 1,2, 5-8). Next,
the value  is computed. This can be done using a comparison circuit with at
most  gates [29]. Then, the absolute dierence di = ex ey is analyzed. In case
that di > `, a value di = 0 should be returned. In lines 10 to 12, we rst check
if there is a bit dierence in the leading     bits, with  = dlog2(`)e. In this
case, the absolute distance is greater or equal than 2 > `. Next, it suces to
analyze the remaining  bits. In lines 14 to 16 we compute the correct absolute
dierence e = abs(a  b) = abs(ex  ey), in case that the leading   bits are all
equal. This value is compared to ` in line 17. As nal result, the circuit outputs
blinded values di and z, for which it holds that 2di   z = shift. Note that,
since the value o = di+r is in the exponent of 2o, a value shift = 0 can not be
recovered directly when removing the blinding factor (e.g. 2r  2 r = 1). For this
reason, the value z = 1 is subtracted in case that shift should be 0.
Finally, a normalization is triggered. Since the sign of the result is still
contained in the value m0, it is necessary that during normalization this value is
extracted and returned as encryption [sz].
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Protocol 14 Garbled Circuit for Addition/Subtraction Protocol
Garbled Circuit C
4: Input: ~v
5: // Remove blinding:
6: v = (~v + (r mod 22)) mod 22
7: a = vf1;:::;g// Bits 1 to  ! ex
8: b = vf+1;:::;2g// Bits + 1 to 2 ! ey
9: if (a < b) then  = 1 else  = 0
10: for i = + 1 to  // Check MSBs
11: si = XOR(ai; bi), ti = OR(si; ti 1)
12: end
13: u := t // if u == 1, then abs(a  b) > `
14: a := a mod 2, b := b mod 2
15: c = a  b, d = b  a
16: if (c < 0) then e = d else e = c
17: if (e > `) then u := 1 else u := 0
18: if (u == 0) then
19: di = e, z = 0
20: else
21: di = 0, z = 1
22: end
23: Output: o=di+r', p=XOR(z; r00), q=XOR(; r000)
Complexity. In Protocol 13, 7 secure multiplications along with 5 encryptions
and one decryption are performed in the homomorphic encryption scheme. The
garbled circuit has +4+5 gates. For 32-bit oating point values, with  = 80,
 = 8 and  = 5 this results in a circuit with roughly 200 gates. Furthermore,
we have to add the complexity for the normalization (Protocol 10).
6.2.3 Multiplication
Multiplication (Protocol 15) of two encrypted oating point values can be re-
duced to secure operations on homomorphic encryptions. Both sign values and
signicands can be multiplied, requiring one secure multiplication each, while
the exponent of the result is the sum of ex and ey. Finally a normalization is
required. Since the sign can be computed separately, the normalization protocol
only has to adjust signicand and exponent.
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Protocol 15 Multiplication
Input: ([sx]; [mx]; [ex]); ([sy]; [my]; [ey])
Output: ([sz]; [mz]; [ez]) where z = x  y
1: [sz] = [sx]  [sy]
2: [m0z] = [mx]  [my]
3: [e0z] = [ex]  [ey]
4: ([mz]; [ez]) = Normalize([m
0
z]; [e
0
z])
Complexity. In the protocol, only 2 secure multiplications and a normalization
have to be performed.
6.2.4 Division
The secure protocol for division is depicted in Protocol 16. Initially, party B
additively blinds the two signicands mx and my, prepares a garbled circuit C
and both C and the value v them to party A. The garbled circuit C implements
a standard pencil and paper division method: First, in lines 5-7 the two operands
are recovered. Next, in line 8 values p and d are initialized with the bits v1; : : : ; v`
and v`+1; : : : ; v2` according to operands mx and my. The major steps of the
division algorithm are contained in lines 10 and 11: Line 10 implements a left
shift, followed by a trial subtraction in line 11. In line 12 the quotient bit is
written accordingly.
Complexity. During the protocol 3 values need to be encrypted and 1 value
decrypted. The circuit has approximately  + 2`2 + 5` gates. For ` = 24 this
results in about 1400 gates. In addition, the complexity of the normalization has
to be added.
6.2.5 Exception Handling
In this section we describe how exceptions can be detected and suggest strategies
on how to treat them.
6.2.5.1 Detection
In order to detect whether an exception has occured, we suggest to introduce a
new ag E, which is kept as encrypted value by party B. This ag will be added
as input to all secure protocols, and an updated version will be returned as
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Protocol 16 Division
Input: Party B: ([sx]; ([mx]; [ex]); (([sy]; [my]; [ey])
Output: Party B: (([sz]; [mz]; [ez])
1: Choose random r0 2R f0; : : : ; 22`+g, r 2R f0; : : : ; 2`+g
2: Compute [v] = [mx + 2
`my   r0]
3: Construct a garbled circuit C which realizes the functionality as follows:
Garbled Circuit C
4: Input: ~v
5: v := (~v + (r0 mod 22`)) mod 22`
6: a = vf1;:::;`g
7: b = vf`+1;:::;2`g
8: Set pi = ai, di+1 = bi for i 2 f1; : : : ; `g
9: for i = `+ 2 to 1
10: p`+2 := p`+1; : : : ; p2 := p1; p1 := 0
11: p0 := p  d
12: if (p0 < 0) then
qi = 0
13: else
p := p0, qi = 1
end
end
14: o = q + r
15: Output: o
Send C, [v] to party A
4: Party A: Evaluate C on ~v = v mod 22`, obtain o, send [o] to Party B
5: Run Normalization on ([o  r]; [ey   ex])
output of each protocol. Alternatively, if a more ne grained exception handling
is necessary, one may want to keep ve dierent ags, one for each type of
exception. We discuss in short the ve types of exceptions and explain how to
modify the protocols to allow for their detection.
The Division by zero-exception can only be triggered in Protocol 16. When
creating the garbled circuit, party B adds the exception ag E as input and
output to the circuit. The divisor is equal to 0 if and only if b` = 0 (the most
signicant bit) in line 7. Thus, the value OR(E; 1  b`) is computed and output
as the new exception ag.
The Overow/Underow -exception is raised whenever a value is to large or to
small to be represented in the given number format. Since we use a homomorphic
encryption scheme with suciently large plaintext space (e.g. for Paillier the
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bitlength k of the plaintext space is typicall much larger than `), it suces to
check for an overow only during normalization. Here an overow/underow can
be detected when the exponent is adjusted in the last line of Protocol 10. The
simplest way of doing this is by running a state of the art comparison protocol
in the garbled circuit in Protocol 10 and compute the exception ag as E :=
(eout  2).
The exceptions Inexact and Invalid Operation are typically triggered jointly
with or after one of the other exceptions have been triggered. In this case the
ag E has been already set. Other reasons for which these types of exceptions
can be triggered depend on the application, e.g. signalize a negative input to a
square root operation and are therefore out of scope for this investigation.
6.2.5.2 Strategies for Exception Handling
We suggest three strategies for exception handling. In the context of secure two
party computation, exceptions have to be handled particularly careful, since re-
vealing that an exception has occurred can reveal much information about the
private inputs of the participating parties. However, any exception naturally ren-
ders all subsequent computations invalid, and thus should be detected. Therefore,
for each application and scenario the strategy for exception handling should be
examined and reconsidered. Three basic strategies can be envisioned:
 Strategy 1: After each arithmetic operation, one checks whether an excep-
tion occurred. On the one hand, this strategy allows maximal transparency,
and allows the two parties to detect an exception as early as it occurred.
On the other hand, this strategy allows to draw conclusions about the input
values of each party, which might have led to a certain exception.
 Strategy 2: Periodically, e.g. after k arithmetic operations, one decrypts and
checks the exception ag. This strategy is similar to Strategy 1. However,
it provides some more privacy since it is not immediately clear when the
exception occurred.
 Strategy 3: Arrange all arithmetic computations in a way that, given that
the semi-honest parties provide correct inputs, no exceptions can occur. In
this case it suces to check the exception ag only for the nal result or
even omit its computation at all.
There is no general rule to tell which of the proposed strategies can be seen
as the best. Clearly, the rst strategy allows to detect exceptions as early as
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they occur. However, this strategy also reveals more information than the other
strategies. For example, in case that the rst operation is a division operation
computed on secret inputs, triggering an division by zero exception immediately
reveals that one of the secret inputs was equal to zero. Thus, when implemen-
ting the protocols one has to decide which strategy to choose depending on the
application scenario.
6.3 Security
We sketch a security proof in the semi-honest attacker model. We need to prove
that the views of both parties can be eciently simulated (i.e. their simulated
views are statistically indistinguishable from a view of a real protocol run, see
[10] for details). Security against party B, in the asymmetric two party scenario,
follows directly from the composition theorem for the semi-honest model (Theo-
rem 7.3.3 in [10]), the security proof for garbled circuits [62] and the fact that B
only sees semantically secure encryptions, which can be simulated by randomized
encryptions of [0]. Security against party A: Whenever party A is to decrypt
some value [x+ r], the simulator sends an encryption of some value r0, chosen
uniformly at random from the same range as the blinding factor r used in the
protocol. This allows for a simulator proof, using the same arguments as for
party B.
Chapter 7
Discussion
In this chapter we discuss the properties of the two approaches to securely com-
pute with non-integer values presented in Chapters 5 and 6, and compare it to
the basic solution of Chapter 4. We will highlight their main dierences and
indicate for which kind of application a specic approach might be advantageous.
The main part of this chapter will consist of an complexity analysis, comparing
the schemes presented in Chapters 5 and 6 with an alternate xed point repre-
sentation with suciently high precision.
7.1 Basic Properties
Given a xed precision of ` bits, both schemes, the logarithmic encoding in
Chapter 5 and the oating point representation in Chapter 6 can approximately
represent 2` dierent values. Both schemes are exible in the sense that the
distance between largest and smallest represented number can be chosen by ad-
justing parameters. For the logarithmic encoding the relative error is constant.
In a oating point representation the relative representation error is also strictly
bounded. Thus, the main dierences of the schemes are in their eciency, as will
be seen in the next section.
7.2 Complexity Analysis
In this section we will describe a theoretical analysis of the complexity of the two
approaches presented in Chapters 5 and 6. The complexity will then be compared
with an alternate xed point representation with suciently high precision (see
Chapter 4). For the comparison, we will assume that the probabilistic rounding
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method (Protocol 3) is used and at most one multiplication is performed. This
approach serves well for a comparison, due to the fact that the complexity of
the probabilistic rounding protocol is easy to analyze and to the fact that this
protocol yields to most ecient schemes for computations in xed point represen-
tation [49]. In case that more consecutive multiplications need to be performed
or a dierent rounding protocol will be used performance will deteriorate; thus
the results presented in this chapter can be seen as optimistic lower bounds for
the complexity of a SMC xed point representation scheme.
Again, we assume that ` bits are used to represent a value in the logarithmic
encoding or the oating point representation.
The cost for performing arithmetic operations is the main dierence that dis-
tinguishes the approach using log encoding from the oating point representation.
While the protocols for all arithmetic operations have about the same complexity
for oating point values, it can be seen that the situation is inherently dierent
in the setting where log encodings are used. In this setting, no ecient method
for computing the LSUM operation is known, i.e. one either has to compute
logarithms under encryption analytically, or (as done in Chapter 5), a solution
based on table-lookups has to be used. The latter allows for ecient solutions for
small values `; however, the complexity of the LSUM operation grows exponen-
tial in the parameter `. As illustrated in Section 5.3, an analytic computation of
the LSUM seems impractical for all values `. While on the one hand additions
and subtractions are rather expensive operations, on the other hand multiplica-
tions, divisions and even exponentiations can be performed very eciently on
log-encoded values.
7.2.1 Computational Complexity
Table 7.1 depicts the computational complexity of the three approaches: The
rst column depicts the computational complexity of arithmetic protocols in
log encoding, the second for oating point and the third column for the basic
implementation using a xed point representation (see Section 4).
As a complexity measure we count the number of 1024-bit modulo multipli-
cations. In order to express one multiplication of values with 1024 bits bitlength,
we assume that the computational complexity of one multiplication grows qua-
dratic with the bitlength of the operands. We further assume that one modular
exponentiation requires 1:5k modular multiplications, where k is the bitlength of
the exponent. This is a realistic assumption, since on average about 50% of the
7.2 Complexity Analysis 85
bits in the exponent will be equal to zero. In the complexity evaluation we ne-
glect the computational cost for evaluating garbled circuits, i.e., we assume that
a call to a hash function is negligible compared to one modular multiplication.
This makes the complexity of the oating point implementation appear to be
constant; however, for the typical parameter sizes used in the experiments this
is a realistic assumptions, since the circuits are rather small. For larger parame-
ters ` one should also consider the complexity of garbled circuits in the oating
point approach. The complexity of operations using logarithmic encoding and
oating point representation were derived by counting the number of operations
that occur during each protocol. For the log-encoding we assumed a xed set of
parameters  = 50; t = 256, C = 1, S = 10 and B = 2. The parameters  and
t would normally be adjusted to the length of the parameter ` (to improve per-
formance), for simplicity and to allow for a direct comparison we assume those
parameters are xed. Parameter C = 1 yields to computations on values with
absolute value less than 1, this corresponds to the estimations we made for the
xed point representation where we also only consider the fractional part for the
complexity analysis.
Protocol Log-Encoding Floating Point Fixed Point
Sum/Subtract 946`+ 8; 709 230,532 22` 23
Product 2 85,916 23` 22
Division 2 52,340 |
Table 7.1: Computational Complexity Measure for Secure Protocols.
The complexity of the xed point representation can be estimated as follows:
Assume that we use a log encoding with ` bit operands. In order to represent
small values with the same accuracy, a xed point representation scheme should
be able to represent the two smallest numbers n1; n2 that can be represented
by the log encoding. This is the case if the absolute error of the xed point
representation is smaller than (n1   n2)=2. For a xed point representation
scheme which uses `FP bits for the fractional part, the absolute representation
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error is 2 `FP 1. Thus it holds
2 `FP 1
!
< (n1   n2)=2
, 2 `FP < (n1   n2)
, 2 `FP < C B (2` 2)=S   C B (2` 1)=S
,  `FP < log2(C) + log2(B(2 2
`)=S  B(1 2`)=S)
,  `FP < log2(B(1 2
`)=S) + log2(B
1=S   1)
,  `FP < (1  2`)=10  3:8
, `FP > 0:1  2` + 3:7: (7.1)
In order to be able to compute the product of two values stored in xed point
representation, the plaintext space of the cryptoosystem has to be twice as large
as 0:1 2`+3:7. This is necessary since temporary results occur which have twice
the bitlength of a normal value stored in xed point representation. Thus we set
`FP := 0:12`+1+7:4 and use this parameter as minimal bitlength of the plaintext
space. We will assume that the values in xed point notation will be encrypted
using Paillier encryption.1 Assuming that the complexity of one modular mul-
tiplication grows quadratic in the operands size, it holds that a multiplication
of two ciphertexts of size 2`FP is about (
2`FP
1024 )
2 more expensive than a 1024-bit
multiplication. As each encryption in the Paillier cryptosystem requires one ex-
ponentiation of an exponent of size `FP, it can be seen that the complexity of
one Paillier encryption grows with `3FP, i.e. cubic complexity in `FP. Furthermore,
according to Inequality (7.1), the parameter `FP has an exponential dependence
on the parameter `. Using the above estimations and counting the number of
operations required for each arithmetic operation yields to the lower bounds for
the computational complexity depicted in the third row of Table 7.1. In particu-
lar, Table 7.1 shows that for larger parameters of ` the xed point representation
can not be implemented eciently. In particular, even for small parameters ` it
can not compete with log-encodings in terms of computational complexity if an
equal amount of additions and multiplications should be performed.
We note that, in xed point representation, the complexity of the division
operation heavily depends on the algorithm which is used for the division and is
therefore omitted in this presentation.
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 plot the computational complexity of one addition (Figure
1Naturally, one could as well use Damgard-Jurik cryptosystem [19], which would be slightly
more ecient. However, this would complicate the complexity analysis even though the asymp-
totic complexity is the same as for Paillier.
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7.1) and one multiplication (Figure 7.2) in each of the dierent representation
schemes. The Y-axis plots the number of 1024-bit multiplications, including the
hidden constants which have been omitted in Table 7.1 and under the assumption
that the minimal length of the Paillier plaintext space is 1024 bits.
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Figure 7.1: Computational Complexity of Addition/Subtraction.
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
x 10 5
Bitlength of Encoding
Co
m
pu
ta
tio
n 
Co
m
pl
ex
ity
 
 
5 7 9 11 13
Log−Encoding
Floating Point
Fixed Point
Figure 7.2: Computational Complexity of one Multiplication.
7.2.2 Communication Complexity
Table 7.2 depicts the communication complexity of the secure protocols for arith-
metic computations. Again, the complexity is presented as a function of the
parameter `, all values are given as kilobytes. As it can be seen, product and
division operations for log encodings as well as additions and subtractions for the
xed point representation can be performed at essentially no cost. However, both
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Protocol Log-Encoding Floating Point Fixed Point
Sum/Subtract `2` 12 0:02`2 + 0:22`+ 14:28 0
Product 0.03 0:02`2 + 0:15`+ 7:19 0:1  2` 11
Division 0:03 0:05`2 + 0:26`+ 8:53 |
Table 7.2: Communication Complexity for Secure Protocols in kilobytes.
schemes exhibit an exponential increase in complexity for the remaining opera-
tions. In particular, the communication complexity of the LSUM operation is
dominated by the term `2` 12 which corresponds to the size of the table trans-
ferred during the table look-up. For the xed point representation, the plaintext
space grows exponentially fast with the parameter ` (see Section 7.2.1). In order
to show the eect of hidden constants (which have been omitted in Table 7.2)
for small values ` we present Table 7.3, which depicts the overall communication
for one protocol run for a given parameter `. It can be seen that for parameters
`  15 the xed point representation has acceptable communication complexity,
while the oating point representation is preferable for larger parameters `.
We plotted the communication complexity of one addition in Figure 7.3 and of
one multiplication in Figure 7.4. The Y-axis plots the communication complexity
in kilobytes. Again, the plots include the hidden constants which have been
omitted in Table 7.2 and made the assumption that the minimal length of the
Paillier encryption is 2048 bits.
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Addition/Subtraction Multiplication
` Log Float Fixed Log Float Fixed
5 4,09 15,88 0,00 0,03 8,44 1,25
6 4,46 16,32 0,00 0,03 8,81 1,25
7 4,85 16,80 0,00 0,03 9,22 1,25
8 5,25 17,32 0,00 0,03 9,67 1,25
9 5,66 17,88 0,00 0,03 10,16 1,25
10 6,10 18,48 0,00 0,03 10,69 1,25
11 6,60 19,12 0,00 0,03 11,26 1,25
12 7,20 19,80 0,00 0,03 11,87 1,25
13 8,00 20,52 0,00 0,03 12,52 2,01
14 9,21 21,28 0,00 0,03 13,21 4,01
15 11,20 22,08 0,00 0,03 13,94 8,01
16 14,82 22,92 0,00 0,03 14,71 16,01
17 21,69 23,80 0,00 0,03 15,52 32,01
18 35,41 24,72 0,00 0,03 16,37 64,01
19 62,98 25,68 0,00 0,03 17,26 128,01
20 119,75 26,68 0,00 0,03 18,19 256,01
21 236,23 27,72 0,00 0,03 19,16 512,01
22 478,25 28,80 0,00 0,03 20,17 1024,01
23 976,31 29,92 0,00 0,03 21,22 2048,01
24 2014,37 31,08 0,00 0,03 22,31 4096,01
25 4160,43 32,28 0,00 0,03 23,44 8192,01
Table 7.3: Communication in kilobytes for selected parameters `.
7.2.3 Overall Comparison
While it is dicult to highlight one of the presented approaches as the best for
arbitrary parameters `, it is possible to give guidelines on which computational
scheme should be used: Unsurprisingly, for small parameters ` the xed point im-
plementation yields to good performance for all arithmetic operations. However,
for parameters `  11 the xed point representation becomes computationally
to complex. Depending on the application, even for smaller parameters we sug-
gest to use the log encoding, as for this scheme the computational complexity on
average2 is lower than for any of the others, and the communication complexity
2We assume that an equal amount of additions and multiplications has to be performed.
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Figure 7.4: Communication Complexity of one Multiplication.
of the log encoding scheme is still better than for the oating point representa-
tion. For much larger parameters, the oating point representation scheme will
be preferable over both xed point and log encoding. The break even point for
the oating point scheme depends on whether communication or computation is
more costly. For current computation- and network hardware, we estimate this
parameter to be in the range between ` = 18 and ` = 20. Clearly, for a given
setup this threshold can easily be determined experimentally.
The choice of the representation scheme will also depend on the type of ap-
plication that should be implemented. For example, for an application which
mainly consists of products/divisions it might be still more ecient to imple-
ment the log encoding even for large parameters `, even though the asymptotic
complexity of the oating point scheme seems to be lower. In particular if an
exponentiation with known exponent should be performed as a secure computa-
tion, even for small ` the log encoding might be advantageous even over a xed
point representation.
Chapter 8
Applications
As an application we describe in this chapter how the computational framework
presented in Chapter 5 can be applied to algorithms that securely analyze geno-
mic and gene product related sequences by using Hidden Markov Models (HMM).
In particular, we consider a scenario as introduced in Chapter 1. Two parties
jointly want to evaluate a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) on a given DNA or
protein sequence. Party A, who is a health care provider acting on behalf of a
patient, has sequenced the patient's genome. A wants to interact with a provider
B, who oers a service to check parts of the genome against a model, encoded
as HMM, for a specic disease. The information \how good" the model ts the
genome determines the likelihood of a disease predisposition, and is therefore in-
teresting to know for A and his patients. However, party A is bound to preserve
the patient's privacy, since DNA data is considered highly sensitve private infor-
mation. At the same time, party B does not want to disclose the HMM since
the model itself is his business secret that distinguishes his service from other
providers.
In this chapter we show how A and B can achieve both goals by providing
a way to run the forward algorithm on the sequence and HMM in an oblivious
manner. As a second application, we consider the case, where both parties want
to run a secure version of the Viterbi algorithm. In this setting, the result of the
Viterbi algorithm explains how the genome sequence can be generated by the
model.
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8.1 Secure Bioinformatics and HMM Evaluation
In this section we review related work in the eld of secure bioinformatics. Some
works deal with the secure analysis of genomic sequences by providing secure
string processing algorithms: [63] considers the problem of securely computing
the edit distance between two strings; [64] presents a secure algorithm to per-
form sequence alignments using the Smith-Waterman algorithm; [65] considers
the problem of securing distributed computations on genomic sequences; [58] pro-
poses an algorithm that allows to run arbitrary queries, formulated as regular
expressions, on genomic sequences in an oblivious way; nally, [66] shows how to
nd a certain pattern in a DNA sequence. These existing works considered ba-
sic string-based bioinformatics algorithms. In contrast we show how to evaluate
much more complex probabilistic queries represented by Hidden Markov Models
(HMMs) on genomic data in a secure way. HMMs are widely used in compu-
tational biology to detect locations with certain properties, e.g., disease related
signals [67, 68, 69] or general properties of important, disease related enzymes,
such as kinases [70, 71, 72].
Some authors considered the problem of securely evaluating HMMs: [73]
contains an allegedly secure way of evaluating Hidden Markov Models on strings.
However, their construction, which uses secret sharing, contains several inaccu-
racies. First, they base their protocols on a cryptographic building block which
computes the index of the maximum of n shared numbers, which leaks informa-
tion and is thus not provably secure; replacing this primitive in [73] with a secure
one is possible. However this results in a severe performance penalty.
Second, and more importantly, their way of computing sums of values repre-
sented in logarithmic notation tends to get numerically unstable: they compute
with cryptographic shares of numbers as if they were reals (in particular, raise the
real number e to the power of large, cryptographic shares and take the natural
logarithm), and treat the results as cryptographic shares as well, without conside-
ring severe rounding errors, which will propagate through the entire computation.
Unfortunately, [73] does not present any experimental results to quantify this er-
ror.
[74] gives another solution to securely evaluating HMMs, where a third party
in form of a commodity server is involved in the computations. This party ne-
cessarily needs to be independent and is not allowed to collude with any of the
parties, otherwise all privacy of the other party will be lost (and, maybe even
worse, the colluding parties can manipulate the result of the computations at
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their will). Even without collusion, it is not fully clear if the protocols compute
correct results, and compute them in a secure way. This is due to the fact that in
the protocols some additive blinding is used to hide temporary results. However,
it is never mentioned if the computations are performed in a nite eld, the inte-
gers or real numbers. This in turn makes it hard to estimate from which domain
the blinding factors are chosen and to evaluate the overall security of the proto-
col. Similar to [73], there are no sucient experimental results to tell whether
the protocols would really provide accurate results for HMMs of realistic size. In
fact, the experiments were only run for sub-protocols on randomly chosen inputs
and were only analyzed due to timing aspects; the algorithm has not been tested
on real-world HMMs.
8.2 Hidden Markov Models
Hidden Markov Models (HMM) are probabilistic methods that model a stream
of symbols by a Markov process, which is driven by \hidden" states of the pro-
cess, unobservable to an outsider. In dierent states the dynamics of the process
diers and thus the statistics of emitted symbols varies with time. States in
bioinformatics applications can be indicators for particular disease related pro-
perties of sequences that code for e.g. non-benecially mutated proteins or sites
of potential post-translationally modications. HMMs are not only used in bioin-
formatics, but have a wide range of applications such as speech recognition [75],
pattern recognition [76] or image classication [77].
More formally, a Hidden Markov Model  = (A;B; ) is characterized by the
following elements:
 A set of S = fS1; S2; : : : ; SNg of N \sites" (hidden states), which reects
experimental observations such as single nucleotides or other more general
symbols. Any sequence of length T , q1q2 : : : qT , of states is called a path Q
through the sites.
 A set V ofM distinct observation symbols per state (the output alphabet):
V = fv1; v2; : : : ; vMg.
 The state transition probability matrix A = faijg, where aij is the probabi-
lity of moving from state Si to state Sj : aij = Prob[qt+1 = Sj j qt = Si] for
1  i  N and 1  j  N , with proper normalization 81iN
P
j aij = 1.
 The emission probabilities B = fbj(k)g in state Sj , where bj(k) is the
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probability of emitting symbol vk at state Sj : bj(k) = Prob[vk at t j qt = Sj ]
for 1  j  N and 1  k M .
 The initial state distribution  = fig, where i is the probability that the
start state is Si: i = Prob[q1 = Si] for 1  i  N .
In typical bioinformatics applications two related problems are fundamental:
Problem 1. Given a Hidden Markov Model  and an observed sequence O =
o1o2 : : : oT , compute the probability Prob[O j] that the HMM can generate the
sequence. This value indicates the signicance of the observation. The problem
is commonly solved by applying the forward algorithm.
Problem 2. Given a Hidden Markov Model  and an observed sequence O =
o1o2 : : : oT , choose a corresponding state path Q = q1q2 : : : qT which best \ex-
plains" the observations, i.e., which maximizes Prob[Q jO; ]. This problem can
be solved by the Viterbi algorithm [78].
8.3 Secure Forward Algorithm
We consider the following two-party scenario. Party A knows a genomic se-
quence O, while party B commands over a specic HMM . A could be a health
care provider, who has sequenced a patient's genome O, but wishes to preserve
the privacy of the patient. B is a drug company or some bioinformatics institute,
which wants to preserve its intellectual property contained within the paramete-
rization of the HMM. Both parties are interested to learn how good the model
ts to the genome O by running the forward algorithm, whereas neither party
wants to share its input with each other. The overall probability reported by the
algorithm can be, for example, the condence of B that A's patient develops a
particular disease.
To compute the probability Prob[O j] for some sequence O = o1o2 : : : oT of
length T , we can employ the forward algorithm. Consider the so-called forward
variable
t(i) = Prob[o1; : : : ; ot; qt = Si j]
which indicates how likely it is to see the sequence o1; : : : ; ot and to end up
in state Si after processing t steps. For 1(i) we have 1(i) = ibi(oi). Given
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Protocol 17 Secure Forward Algorithm (Part 1)
Input: Party A: Sequence O = o1o2 : : : oT
Party B: HMM  = (A;B; )
Output: Prob[O j]
1: Initialization:
Party A: For each oi prepare a vector i = fi1; : : : ; iMg in a way that
ij = 1 if vj = oi and ij = 0 otherwise.
Encrypt i component wise and send [i] to B
2: Party B: // Compute emission probabilities:
for i = 1 to N
for j = 1 to T
[bi(oj)] =
QM
k=1[ik]
bi(vk)
[bi(oj)] =
QM
k=1[ik]
bi(vk)
[bi(oj)] := ([bi(oj)]; [bi(oj)])
end
end
3: Party B:
for i = 1 to N
[1(i)] = LPROD([i]; [bi(o1)])
end
t(i), the probabilities t+1(i) can be computed inductively by
t+1(i) = bi(ot+1) 
NX
j=1
t(j)  aji:
Finally, we have
Prob[O j] =
NX
i=1
T (i):
A full description of the realization of the forward algorithm using the fra-
mework of Section 5.2 can be found in Protocols 17 and 18. Note that in the
protocols for clearness of presentation we omit to explicitly label encoded ele-
ments: all values aij ; bi(vj); i and i should be read as encoded values according
to Section 5.2.
In the initialization step, party A provides party B with an encrypted version
of the sequence, where each symbol of O is encoded as a binary vector of length
M (the position of the one in the vector encodes the symbol). This allows party
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Protocol 18 Secure Forward Algorithm (Part 2)
4: Induction:
for t = 1 to T   1
for i = 1 to N
[11] = LPROD([t(1)]; [a1i])
for j = 2 to N
[j1] = LSUM([
j 1
1 ];LPROD([t(j)]; [aji)])
end
[t+1(i)] = LPROD([bi(ot+1)]; [
N
1 ])
end
end
5: Termination:
[21] = LSUM([T (1)]; [T (2)])
for i = 3 to N
LSUM([i 11 ]; [T (i)])
end
return [Prob[O j]] := [N1 ]
B to easily compute encryptions [bi(oj)] of the emission probabilities by using
the homomorphic properties of the cryptosystem in step 2. In addition, party B
initializes the values 1(i) as the product of the probabilities i and the emission
probabilities bi(o1) for the rst observation symbol (step 3). In step 4 the parties
compute interactively the forward-variables t(i), and in step 5 the result of the
forward algorithm [Prob[O j]], which can be decrypted by A.
Concerning complexity, note that the induction in step 3 is iterated T 1 times
and in each iteration the protocols LPROD and LSUM are used approximately
N2 times each. Thus the forward algorithm requires O(N2  T ) LPROD and
LSUM operations.
8.4 Secure Viterbi Algorithm
Returning to our previous example of a health care provider A and a bioin-
formatics company B, the two parties might face an additional problem: given a
protein or a genomic sequence O of A's patient, where exactly are signals of ma-
licious mutations or other sequence changes, that might eventually be targeted
by gene therapy? Here B needs to report the best matching state path Q back
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Protocol 19 Secure Viterbi Algorithm (Part 1)
Input: Party A: Sequence O = o1o2 : : : oT
Party B: HMM  = (A;B; )
Output: Party B state sequence q1q2 : : : qt
Initialization:
1-2: These steps are identical to steps 1-2 of the forward algorithm
3: Party B:
for i = 1 to N
[1(i)] = LPROD([i]; [bi(o1)])
end
4: Induction:
for t = 2 to T
for i = 1 to N
[M11] = LPROD([t 1(1)]; [a1i])
[	11] = [1]
for j = 2 to N
[tmp] = LPROD([t 1(j)]; [aji])
1 := ([M]j 11 ; [	
j 1
1 ])
2 := ([tmp]; [j])
([Mj1]; [	
j
1]) = LMAX(1; 2)
end
[t(i)] = LPROD([bi(ot)]; [MN1 ])
[ t(i)] := [	
N
1 ]
end
end
to A, in a way that A can identify certain regions, e.g. protein-DNA binding
domains, that might be malicious, thus excluding \healthy" regions from further
consideration and treatment. Again, A has to protect the privacy of the patient
by not disclosing the sequence O, and B does not want to report details of the
topology and parameterization of the HMM because of intellectual property or
other business related reasons. In order to interpret the state sequence Q, A
only needs information on how to interpret special states that indicate diseases,
while the rest of the HMM (in particular the parameterization of the probabilistic
transitions) can remain hidden.
The Viterbi algorithm nds a state path Q = q1q2 : : : qT that best explains the
observation O = o1o2 : : : oT , i.e., which maximizes Prob[Q jO; ]. To nd such a
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state sequence Q for a given observation sequence O, we compute probabilities
t(i) = max
q1q2:::qt 1
Prob[q1q2 : : : qt = i; o1o2 : : : ot j];
where t(i) is the highest likelihood of all paths of length t (derived from the rst
t input symbols o1; : : : ; ot) which end in state Si. Given t(i), the value t+1(i)
can be computed inductively by
t+1(i) = bi(ot+1)  max
1jN
t(j)  aji:
In addition to t(i) the Viterbi Algorithm makes use of another variable  t+1(i),
which allows keeping track of the index of the chosen maximum:
 t+1(i) = argmax1jN t(j)  aji:
When all symbols from the input sequence are processed, the algorithm per-
forms a backtracking step to compute the state sequence Q = q1q2 : : : qT by using
the values  t(i). We set qT to the state which maximizes  T (i) for 1  i  N .
Since  t(i) records the best matching predecessor of each state, we can com-
pute the optimal state sequence in reverse order by qT ;  T (qT );  T 1( T (qT ));
: : : ;  2( 3(: : :  T (qT ))).
Protocols 19 and 20 depict a secure realization of the Viterbi algorithm. Using
the same notation as in the forward algorithm, all values aij ; bi(vj); i and i
should be read as encoded triplets according to Section 5.2. The protocol starts
in a similar way as Protocol 17, namely by providing party B with encryptions of
the emission probabilities bi(oj). In step 3 party B initializes the values 1(i). In
the induction step the parties interactively compute the maximum of the values
LPROD([t 1(j)]; [aji]), where 1  j  N . Along with the maximum they
compute for each state an encryption of [ t(i)]. In steps 6 and 7 they perform
backtracking, providing party A with the most likely path q1q2 : : : qT . This is
done as follows: For each 2  t  T , starting with t = T , party B computes
values [vi] = [(v   i)  ri +  t 1(i)], where v is the current (best matching) state
qt. Thus the value (v   i) will be equal to 0 if and only if i = qt. In this case
(v   i)  ri will be equal to 0 and therefore [vi] = [(v   i)  ri +  t 1(i)] contains
the correct predecessor state qt 1 =  t 1(qt). In any other case, (v   i)  ri will
evaluate to a random value from Zu, which will be, with very high probability,
greater than N (the number of possible states).
In terms of complexity, the Viterbi and forward algorithm are very similar:
each LSUM operation in the forward algorithm is replaced by LMAX; further-
more, the Viterbi algorithm requires backtracking to compute the nal result. In
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Protocol 20 Secure Viterbi Algorithm (Part 2)
5: Termination:
([M21]; [	21]) = LMAX(([T (1)]; [1]); ([T (2)]; [2]))
for i = 3 to N
([Mi1]; [	i1]) = LMAX(([M
i 1
1 ]; [	
i 1
1 ]); ([T (i)]; [i]))
end
[qT ] := [	
N
1 ]
Send qT to party A
Set t := T + 1, [v0] = [qT ]
6: Backtracking
Party B:
Set t := t  1, [v] := [v0]
If t = 1 terminate, else:
Choose random values r1; : : : ; rN 2R Zu
for i = 1 to N
[vi] = [(v   i)  ri +  t 1(i)]
end
Send [v1]; : : : ; [vN ] to Party A
7: Party A:
vi = Decrypt([vi]) for 1  i  N
Find value v0 2 fv1; : : : ; vNg for which it holds 1  v0  N
qt := v
0
Send [v0] to party A
Go back to step 6
summary, the Viterbi algorithm requires O(TN2) LPROD and LMAX opera-
tions.
8.5 Implementation and Experimental Results
We have implemented the framework for performing secure computations on non-
integer values as well as the algorithms to evaluate HMMs in C++ using the GNU
GMP library version 5.0.1. As hash function we used the SHA-2 implementation
included in Crypto++ Library 5.6.1 [79]. Tests were run on a computer with a
2.1 GHz 8 core processor and 4GB of RAM running Ubuntu version 9.04. The
parties A and B were implemented as two multi-threaded entities of the same
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Figure 8.1: Performance of the LSUM operation.
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Figure 8.2: Communication complexity of the LSUM operation.
program. Therefore our tests do not include network latency (however, many
of the computations can be run in parallel and do not depend on each other,
thus the dierent threads could continue computing while sending and receiving
messages).
8.5.1 Complexity of LSUM
Since computing the sum of two encoded elements is the most complex basic
operation, we rst focus on an analysis of LSUM. We have implemented two
versions of the LSUM operation: The rst implementation uses the OPRF
construction from Section 5.1.1 based on the Paillier cryptosystem. The second
implementation builds on the OT based construction presented in Section 5.1.2,
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using the DGK cryptosystem. Both versions of the LSUM have been imple-
mented with all possible optimizations, in particular, both implementations only
operate on positive values, neglecting computations for zero- and sign- ags. The
RSA moduli for both Paillier and DGK were chosen to have 1024 bit, while the
size of one garbled circuit key was set to 80 bits. We compare the results of
both implementations. Figure 8.1 depicts the computational complexity. Both
programs were run for dierent table sizes jT j in the range between jT j = 210 and
jT j = 215, each implementation was allowed to reuse each table (in the OPRF
construction) resp. each set of polynomials (in the OT based construction) 50
times. Figure 8.1 depicts the results: The Y-axis shows the computational com-
plexity in milliseconds (wall clock time) required to perform one LSUM, for
dierent table sizes (X-axis, logarithmic scale). While the OPRF based construc-
tion grows quickly in jT j, it can be seen that our OT based solution only grows
moderately from 7:3ms for jT j = 210 to 11:7ms for jT j = 215. The large die-
rence in the measured timings can be explained by the fact that the complexity
of the OPRF based construction is dominated by the construction of the table
T , thus the amount of work grows linearly with jT j. The amount of work in the
OT based construction is dominated by constructing and evaluating the garbled
circuits in Step 2 of Protocol 7, which grows only with log(jT j).
Figure 8.2 depicts the amortized communication complexity of a single LSUM
operation. The Y-axis plots the communication in kilobytes. For the OPRF ba-
sed construction, this is dominated by transmitting the table T . In the OT
based construction, again the transmission of the garbled circuits dominates the
communication complexity. We see that the communication complexity of the
OPRF based construction indeed scales perfectly linear with the table size, while
the complexity of the OT based construction is dominated by the logarithmic
growth of the garbled circuits.
Thus, comparing the two implementations, we see that the OT based construc-
tion has a very low computational complexity compared to the OPRF based
construction. In terms of communication, the OPRF based construction is about
ve times more ecient for small table sizes jT j. According to the specic equip-
ment and bandwidth limitations, one might choose one or the other solution,
or a combined approach where a certain percentage of the LSUM operations
is computed using the OT based solution, and the rest using the OPRF based
construction. In the remaining tests we will use the OT based construction.
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Figure 8.3: Boxplots of the scores of HMMER and our implementation.
8.5.2 Complexity of private HMM analysis.
In order to demonstrate the practicality of the secure forward and the Viterbi
algorithm, we implemented the forward and Viterbi algorithms in HMMER [80],
version 2.3.2, which is widely used in the bioinformatics community to perform
analysis of DNA and protein sequences. Real values were encoded and encrypted
as described in Section 5.2, while the LSUM operation was realized by using the
OT based construction implemented for positive values.
HMMs used in HMMER. HMMER uses a special class of HMMs, namely
Prole Hidden Markov Models (PHMMs) [81], which have a specic topological
structure; in particular, each state in the model can have at most T  N suc-
cessors (i.e., all other transitions are implicitly set to zero). Since the general
structure of such models is publicly known, this allows to decrease the asympto-
tic complexity of both algorithms to O(TN). In order to be able to compare the
accuracy of our results with HMMER, we decided to implement the same variant
of forward and Viterbi algorithm that is used in HMMER.
We tested our implementation with several HMMs from the PFAM data-
base [82]. Among them are models which are most relevant for identication of
protein domains, that play crucial roles in oncogenic transformations and other
diseases connected to signaling in cells. In particular, we chose HMMs of three
dierent sizes: A small sized model (SH3 1, PF00018) of length 48, a medium
sized model (Ras, PF00071) of length 162 and a large model (BID, PF06393) of
length 196. Here length refers to the number of sites N .
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Parameter Choices for Number Representation. Through empirical tests
on a large set of candidate parameters, we determined B, S, C and the table size
jT j in a way that our secure realization of the HMM algorithms can dierentiate
well between matching and non-matching sequences; in particular we chose the
parameters from the candidate set that yielded the smallest deviation from the
HMMER scores and limited the necessary table size.
We xed parameters (see Section 5.2) B = 2:71, S = 10, while log2C is set
to 100, 250 and 330 for the small, medium and large models. Note that the in-
termediate results during the computation can become quite large (in particular,
this is the case when a genomic sequence matches well against the model) and
can lie in the range of [0; 2200] and even above in rare cases. We further note that
all log-odd score values are positive. For the small, medium and large models we
chose tables of size 1400, 3520 and 4600, respectively, in the LSUM operation.
Despite heavy quantization, our solution is still numerically accurate: In
particular, we compared the scores of the forward algorithm, as produced by
HMMER, with the scores of our implementation for 50 matching and 50 non-
matching sequences. Figure 8.3 shows (for the small, medium and large model)
four boxplots: The scores of the original HMMER implementation (a) and our
privacy preserving implementation (b) for matching sequences; and the scores of
the HMMER implementation (c) and our implementation (d) for non-matching
sequences. It can be seen that corresponding boxes (a and b, as well as c and
d) show a close to perfect overlap; thus, despite the quantization inicted by
the logarithmic representation, our implementation yields very similar scores
as HMMER. Furthermore, the errorbars of the boxplots b and d do not overlap,
which shows that our privacy perserving implementation can perfectly distinguish
matching from non-matching sequences. Thus, the number representation is
suitable for the problem domain.
Algorithm: LSUM (LMAX) LPROD
Forward algorithm (Viterbi)
- small model 14,161 25,971
- medium model 162,491 297,929
- large model 225,984 414,337
Table 8.1: Operation count for Forward- and Viterbi algorithm.
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Algorithm Small Medium Large
Forward 22 298 449
Viterbi 94 933 1357
Table 8.2: Computational complexity in seconds.
8.5.2.1 Computational complexity
We measure the computational complexity of the forward Algorithm (Proto-
cols 17 and 18) and the Viterbi algorithm (Protocols 19 and 20). Table 8.2
depicts the average runtime (wall clock time) of a single matching operation. On
the average, 14,161, 162,491 and 225,984 LSUM operations had to be performed
for the small, medium and large model when applying the forward algorithm for
various dierent test sequences of dierent length. In the same tests, the average
count for LPROD operations were 25,971 for the small, 297,929 for the medium
and 414,337 for the large model. Note that in these tests we allowed parallel
computations on multiple cores of the processor (e.g., we allowed to parallelize
computation of the polynomials, run multiple LSUM operations in parallel, etc).
Even though we did not fully optimize our programs at this point (only 3 out
of 8 cores were used on average), we believe that the results are nevertheless
insightful: For example, running the forward algorithm on the medium sized mo-
del requires approximately 5 minutes, despite performing 297,929 invocations of
LPROD and 162,491 invocations of LSUM.
Algorithm Small Medium Large
Forward 182:0 844:0 1222:8
Viterbi 60:0 701:4 1030:0
Table 8.3: Communication complexity in MB.
8.5.2.2 Communication complexity
The communication complexity measures the trac between the two parties.
This value mainly depends on the size of the RSA modulus n, which was set to
1024 bits. The key size for the garbled circuits was set to 80 bit.
For the forward algorithm, the major part of the communication complexity
is caused by transmitting the tables used for the LSUM operations. For the
Viterbi algorithm, communication complexity depends mainly on the underlying
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comparison protocol LMAX. Table 8.3 depicts the communication complexity
for both protocols.
106 Applications
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
In this thesis we presented dierent approaches which allow to compute with non-
integer values in the encrypted domain. We have shown that it is possible, and
in fact practical to perform these computations. In particular, we investigated
two dierent approaches on how to represent and compute with values taken
from a real domain and provided a theoretical and practical evaluation of their
properties:
Secure computations using logarithmic encoding. The rst approach re-
presents values using a logarithmic encoding. This yields to an representation
scheme with constant relative error which can be specied in an easy and accu-
rate way by adjusting a set of diferent parameters. This approach allows for very
ecient arithmetic operations on values encoded and encrypted using the loga-
rithmic representation. In particular, it resulted in a computational framework
that allows to process both very small and very large values with good practical
performance. We provided secure two-party protocols to perform all arithmetic
operations on encrypted and encoded values in an oblivious way.
Securely processing encrypted oating point values. The second ap-
proach implements the well known IEEE 754 oating point standard in a two
party setting. Our secure implementation strictly follows the IEEE 754 standard
and stores sign, mantissa and exponent as dierent encryptions. Our protocols
allow two parties A and B to privately perform all arithmetic computations
on oating point values. These protocols can be seen as an initial solution to
this problem. While many further optimizations are possible, we believe that
our protocols can be seen as basis for many practical applications. While the
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performance of the arithmetic operations is slightly worse than for logarithmic
encodings for small applications, this approach has a better asymptotic behavior
and is therefore better suited for large applications.
As future work, we suggest to investigate a more ne grained exception hand-
ling. Also, a next step would be to implement a oating point version which uses
the full plaintext space of the Paillier cryptosystem. This would allow for larger
signicants, thus a normalization would not have to be run after each arithmetic
operation.
Evaluation of the presented techniques. We showed that the approach ta-
ken in this thesis is indeed practical and can be used to solve real world problems.
We demonstrated its practicality by applying the framework using logarithmic
encoding to the problem of protecting privacy in genomic sequence analysis. In
particular, we showed how to interactively process Hidden Markov Models in
an oblivious way by applying either the forward or the Viterbi algorithm. Des-
pite the large number of operations performed during the computation (which
requires hundreds of thousands of complex cryptographic operations), the result
is numerically accurate and can be obtained on standard computing equipment
within reasonable time.
Future directions. We see this work as a solid foundation for future work
in the eld of secure multiparty computation with non-integer values. It can
and should be improved further to gain more ecient protocols computing on
logarithmic encoding and oating point values; the work presented in this thesis
can serve as a reference implementation to identify possible future alternative
approaches which might yield to better accuracy or better performance.
We see dierent ways to continue this line of research in the future. Firstly,
one should investigate how to transfer the results presented in this thesis to
the setting with more than two parties. As a second direction we suggest to
investigate which of the proposed techniques is better suited for parallelization.
Since it seems that the current development in computer hardware technology
tends to processors with multiple cores instead of one core with faster CPU, it
should be desirable to investigate approaches for SMC which can make use of the
current development in computer hardware.
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